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Introduction 
Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) are documents that help organisations identify the most effective way to 
comply with data protection obligations, such as the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA), and meet expectations 
of privacy held by individuals.  By highlighting risks and proposing solutions at an early stage, PIAs help 
reduce damage to a firm’s reputation, legal action, financial penalties and other costs incurred through the 
triggering of potential scandals.  The purpose of the PIA is to ensure that privacy risks are minimised while 
allowing the aims of the project to be met whenever possible.   
This document first sets out the need for a PIA in more detail along with information flows for the BioConnect 
system.  Our consultations with various stakeholders are then discussed before outlining the risks and 
proposed solutions for the system.  Lastly our PIA outcomes propose which of the solutions should be 
implemented and how the project should be managed to address risks now and in the future. 
As per the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) PIA code of practice [1], conducting a PIA produces 
better policies and systems, and improves relations between organisations and individuals.  A PIA enables 
an organisation to systematically and thoroughly analyse how a particular project or system will affect the 
privacy of the individuals involved.  These risks, such as those causing distress to individuals, or impacts of a 
datastore being compromised, are identified by analysing how the proposed uses of personal information 
and technology will work in practice.  Our analysis also included privacy concerns gathered after consulting 
stakeholders who will be working with, or be affected by, the project.   
Privacy 
The higher the risk level - and the more intrusive the project - the higher the impact on privacy.  We can say 
privacy is the right of the an individual to be left alone [1].  This can be physical privacy, where a person 
wants their own personal space without intrusion and searches, or informational privacy, where a person 
controls, edits, manages and deletes information about themselves, plus decides how much of that 
information is shared with others.  Intrusion in the informational sense may regard disclosure without consent 
or collecting too much information on an individual.  Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998 [2] concerns the 
right to respect for private and family life. 
Privacy risk, which this PIA seeks to minimise, is the risk of harm arising through an intrusion into privacy.  It 
can be obvious, like financial loss.  It can also be less defined, like identify theft, breakdown of relationships 
or negative effects on society in the wider sense, such as a perceived loss of personal autonomy. 
BioConnect Background 
 
BioConnect is a new Internet of Things (IoT) product that uses a combination of facial recognition and a 
mobile phone MAC address tracking for authorising access to Wi-Fi.  The system requires user consent to 
access the Wi-Fi unless they have already given their consent via previous use.  The Wi-Fi network will be 
provided by BioConnect.  It is envisaged BioConnect is most beneficial in three main areas: large public, 
private or hostile environments, on travel networks and at home.  The terms ‘phone’ and ‘device’ are 
interchangeable from this point on.  Example usage: 
 
 In the home for controlled Wi-Fi access to prevent unauthorised use of devices, for example by 
children.  
 In public places to reduce device theft and help catch thieves. 
 Across a regional or international travel network incorporating subways, buses, train stations, 
airports and such like.  It may be particularly useful for helping to secure large travel networks which 
may under terrorist threat, like the London Underground. 
 Locating individuals under some kind of time pressure, for example those who are late for a flight, or 
in more severe circumstances trying to pin-point terrorists inside a building where hostages are 
being held. 
 In retail stores for tracking customer movements. 
 In buildings for tracking who is inside, and thus who is not. 
 For specific surveillance e.g. on travel networks, sports stadiums, entertainment parks, universities, 
schools, workplaces, supermarkets, conferences and events with controlled access, for example via 
turnstiles.  This helps reduces risks of crime and terrorist attacks in venues and environments with a 
high density of people. 
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In order to join a Wi-Fi network, the system requires a picture of the user’s face.  The first time a user joins a 
network, this is stored with the MAC address of the device attempting to access the Wi-Fi.  Consider a MAC 
address to be a unique ID for each phone.  Once a facial image and MAC address are recorded for a given 
device, the next time access is attempted, the image of the user must match the original capture.  When a 
user returns to an environment where they have previously used the Wi-Fi and requests access once more, 
the system will check their face against the stored picture, and if the device MAC address matches the 
stored MAC address, then Wi-Fi access will be granted.   
 
In a home situation for example this prevents children using parent’s devices.  In other environments, if 
required, it is possible to alert an authority if a previously registered device attempts access and the image of 
the individual does not match that which is stored.  This authority could be an on-site administrator, or a 
security team.  In environments where the datastore is shared with official security services, they can be 
notified also, for example if a known criminal or terror suspect is identified.  
 
In most cases it is thought the camera in the device attempting access will be used to take the picture.  
Alternatively, it can be taken via the installed cameras in the environment.  For example, a camera in a 
user’s house, or via a special kiosk camera in public, or cameras installed in the back of seats on a train. 
 
The system can track users in an environment via their MAC address.  People can also be tracked via their 
facial image.  For example, in an airport if a connected device is stationary for an abnormal period of time, 
security can be notified and it can be investigated.  The MAC address allows the specific model of device to 
be identified.  Samsung Galaxy Note 7 devices, which at time of writing are vulnerable to catching fire, have 
been banned by the US Department of Transportation from being carried onto a plane either in hand luggage 
or checked-in luggage. 
 
  
Stuart Millar 13616005 
4 
The Need for a PIA 
The ICO created a set of screening questions to help identify when a PIA is needed [1].  We begin by 
analysing the project using these questions, and if any of the answers are ‘yes’, then we can say a PIA is 
strongly recommended.  What follows are each of the questions and the answers pertaining to BioConnect. 
Will the project involve the collection of new information about individuals? 
 
Yes.  BioConnect will collect facial recognition images of individuals and mobile phone MAC addresses of 
the devices that they are using.  This is new information which is not already available to us as a company. 
 
Will the project compel individuals to provide information about themselves? 
 
Yes.  To use the service, individuals will be compelled to provide information about themselves.  It is 
proposed a facial recognition image is required along with their device’s MAC address. 
 
Will information about individuals be disclosed to organisations or people who have not previously 
had routine access to the information? 
 
Yes, in certain circumstances.  The facial recognition images and MAC addresses may be shared or pooled 
with security services depending on the implementation of the product and we will be obliged to assist with 
investigations relating to, for example, national security or prevention of crime. 
 
Are you using information about individuals for a purpose it is not currently used for, or in a way it is 
not currently used? 
 
Yes.  We are not aware of widespread installations of a system that uses a combination of facial recognition 
and mobile phone MAC address tracking in order to grant access to a Wi-Fi network.  Separately, facial 
recognition technology already exists, as does the ability to track mobile phone locations via MAC addresses 
within a local network. 
 
Does the project involve you using new technology which might be perceived as being privacy 
intrusive? For example, the use of biometrics or facial recognition. 
 
Yes.  We appreciate that facial recognition could be viewed as intrusive.  The technology is not common in 
the environments that we are proposing, for example at home and in public places. 
 
Will the project result in you making decisions or taking action against individuals in ways which can 
have a significant impact on them? 
 
Yes.  These decisions and actions taken vary in severity.  If a potentially stolen device attempts to access 
the Wi-Fi network and the facial recognition image does not match that which is stored, the security team in a 
given environment may be notified depending on the protocol of that environment.  More serious cases such 
as identifying wanted criminals and preventing terrorism may mean official law enforcement officials are 
involved leading to possible cautions or arrests. 
 
Is the information about individuals of a kind particularly likely to raise privacy concerns or 
expectations? For example, health records, criminal records or other information that people would 
consider to be particularly private. 
 
Yes.  The information centres on tracking and identifying individuals.  Provided the required data exists and 
has not been deleted, at a given point in time it will be possible to build a picture of which Wi-Fi networks a 
device has used over a set period of time, and hence where that same user has been, by filtering the 
datastore to search for a given MAC address or given facial recognition image. 
 
Will the project require you to contact individuals in ways which they may find intrusive? 
 
No.  There is no intended functionality in this product to contact individuals via their device, which could be 
considered intrusive, or via any other intrusive manner.  However, if this changes then we will certainly need 
to evaluate this and conduct another PIA accordingly, for example if some sort of alerts need sent to a 
device in the event of a Wi-Fi breach or some other security event. 
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Information Flows 
This section explains how the information in the BioConnect system is obtained, used and retained.  In other 
words, what information is used, what it is used for, who it is obtained from and disclosed to, who will have 
access and any other necessary information.  It also details how it is collected, used, deleted and how many 
individuals are affected.  Here, we have used an adaptation of data mapping and information flow similar to 
that used in the NHS [3], as it was felt it fitted well with the semantics of this project.  To begin with, we can 
describe the source and justification of collecting the data involved: 
1. Facial recognition image from phone 
Source: The user’s device.  The image is taken with their camera and is uploaded to the system server when 
requested. 
 
Justification: Needed for access to Wi-Fi.  If an image already exists on the system for a user, then they do 
not need to upload another image.  Tightens security by preventing other people using that same device to 
access Wi-Fi.  At home, prevents unauthorised use of devices, for example by children.  Helps identify 
known criminals or suspects who are using the Wi-Fi service and so are present in the area. 
 
2. Facial recognition image from installed IoT camera 
Source: An installed IoT camera. 
 
Justification: Once a user’s device requests to re-join a network they have used before, the IoT camera 
automatically takes a facial recognition image and checks it against that held in the datastore.  If they match, 
and the MAC addresses match, then access is granted.  This process speeds up both re-joining a Wi-Fi 
network and the rejection of access also.  We can track by facial recognition as well. 
 
3. Device MAC address 
 
Source: Any device which attempts to access the network, the source is the device itself. 
 
Justification: Used in conjunction with the facial recognition.  If both match a previously held record, then 
access is granted.  On first-time use this is stored with the facial recognition image, effectively forming a 
record for a user.  The MAC address allows us to detect what phone models are being used and if any 
banned devices are in use.  We can also track a MAC address in the Wi-Fi network at the same time as 
facial recognition, which lets us report abnormal behaviour, such as suspect devices being stationary, or if a 
user path deviates abnormally from the MAC address path. 
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Next, the flow of the information can be studied in Figure 1 below.  This includes details of who has access 
to the data, audit trails, the format and storage of the data, who is responsible for it, if it is to be shared, and 
how the data is transferred between points of rest.  Depending on the nature of the system usage, the 
information for only half a dozen users could be stored, or it could run to hundreds of thousands or millions. 
Figure 1 - BioConnect information flow between points of rest 
Location 1: User device or IoT camera Location 2:  BioConnect server
1. Facial recognition image from 
phone
For images taken with the user’s phone, 
the user has sole access to the image 
before transfer. The image has a date 
and time stamp, created by the user’s 
phone.  At this point before transfer the 
image is stored in an unencrypted 
format on the user’s phone.  The user is 
responsible for the data, since it has not 
been transferred.  Here, the image is 
only to be shared with the BioConnect 
server if the user proceeds with 
attempting to connect to the Wi-Fi 
network.
2. Facial recognition image from 
installed IoT camera
Immediately once the image is captured 
from the IoT camera, and before it is 
sent to the server, no-one has access at 
this point as it has not been transmitted.  
The image will be date and time 
stamped by the IoT camera.
At this point before transfer the image is 
stored in an unencrypted format in 
memory in the IoT camera.  BioConnect 
is responsible for the data here, the 
image resides on an IoT device owned 
by company and the image was 
captured by the company.  The image is 
only to be shared with the BioConnect 
server/datastore if the user proceeds 
with attempting to connect to the Wi-Fi 
network, otherwise it is deleted.
3. Device MAC address
This data is accessible by the user 
though it is not likely they will be aware 
of it.  BioConnect can record the MAC 
address of any device either searching 
generally for available Wi-Fi networks 
(called a probe request) or when 
specifically joining a BioConnect Wi-Fi 
network.  Even if a device does not join 
the network the MAC address making 
the request can still be recorded.  At this 
point, before any transmission, only the 
user has access to their MAC address.  
Records are kept of each individual 
MAC address.  Before transmission to 
the BioConnect server the MAC address 
is unencrypted and resides on the user 
device.  Until it is captured by 
BioConnect, the MAC address is not the 
responsibility of the firm.  The MAC 
address cannot be shared at this point 
as BioConnect has not captured it.
1. Facial recognition image from 
phone
2. Facial Recognition Image from 
installed IoT camera
3. Device MAC address
Here, the BioConnect security teams 
who monitor the automated facial 
recognition system have access to all 
the data.  This is a select number of 
vetted and trained staff and access to 
the data is secured via username and 
password login.  Every access to the 
datastore is recorded as an audit trail 
with the date, time, the user who 
accessed it and any file activity.  The 
image data and MAC address are 
stored in an encrypted format with a 
unique user ID.  BioConnect are 
responsible for the data here, 
specifically the BioConnect security 
team.  
Under normal circumstances this data is 
not to be shared with anyone else.  
However environment specific 
arrangements may exist where the 
datastore is shared with law 
enforcement agencies for example to 
monitor for known terrorists.  
BioConnect may also be requested to 
provide this information to the 
authorities in the event of some legal or 
criminal investigation.
Once the user starts the 
process of sending the image 
to the server, it is at that point 
the image is encrypted.  This 
encryption needs to be strong 
but lightweight enough to be 
handled by the user device.  
The encrypted image is then 
sent over the network to the 
BioConnect server. 
Before the image is 
transmitted to the server it is 
encrypted.  Again this 
encryption needs to be strong 
but lightweight enough to be 
handled by the user device.  
The encrypted image is then 
sent over the network to the 
BioConnect server.
A device broadcasts its MAC 
address when it searches for 
Wi-FI networks and also when 
it attempts to join a specific 
network.  This is as per the 
IEEE 802.11 standard for 
WLAN and Wi-FI [20]. The 
encryption of this transmission 
depends on the device.
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Consultation 
Consultation is a crucial part of the PIA which lets internal and external stakeholders highlight privacy risks, 
and sometimes solutions, based on their own specialist area.  
Four stakeholders were selected for consultation and below are descriptions of their profiles, why they were 
selected and why they were asked the questions chosen.  
The full questionnaires for each stakeholder along with their answers can be found in Appendix A. 
 Stakeholder 1 is a home-owning female parent, 40 years-old, with two children under the age of 10 
years-old.  They have various devices at home that could use this system though this stakeholder is 
not particularly tech-savvy.  Also, they use public transport regularly both on their own and 
sometimes bring their children.  This gave a family viewpoint and concerns parents would have.  
Overly technical responses from them were not the aim, rather we wanted concerns that are more 
likely to be held by the public at large, who used Wi-Fi occasionally on the move, but for whom their 
family and their personal safety were the priorities. 
 
 Stakeholder 2 is a senior business executive that travels internationally daily by air and by train.  
When they travel they also use their laptop, tablet and mobile device for business use and personal 
use.  We chose a businessman to get an idea of concerns of someone who travels regularly and 
would be subject to heightened security procedures in places such as airports or train stations, and 
who may be concerned about their business data being compromised by using Wi-Fi outside the 
relative safety of their office.  Also, we assert a businessman on the move is time poor and we were 
interested in how much attention would be paid to terms of service for Wi-Fi and if BioConnect may 
make them feel safer when travelling given terrorist threats. 
 
 Stakeholder 3 sits on the internal cyber security committee of BioConnect.  They previously were an 
ethical hacker and worked as a contractor to strengthen vulnerable systems.  From time to time they 
also appear as a guest in the media to discuss cyber security incidents.  This stakeholder was 
chosen to use their experience commentating on negative incidents in the press to get opinion on 
how the media would react to an unfavourable situation.  We also wanted comparison with similar 
projects to see if there is a risk of BioConnect being unreasonable with the data collection for this 
project.  Given their background we could also gain some extra insight into technical mitigations. 
 
 Stakeholder 4 is a 23-year-old tech savvy university student living in London.  They are something of 
a fair-weather protester with regard to privacy and human rights but they are still important to this 
stakeholder, and they attend rallies when they can.  They’ve been the victim of phone theft in the 
past and their parents were caught up in the London Underground bombing in 2005, although they 
were not harmed.  There are large parts of society that are more privacy sensitive than others, and 
we wanted a stakeholder in this group who had been affected negatively in the past by an incident 
that could be prevented in future by the BioConnect system.  Selecting a student may give more 
emotional answers to highlight potential risks given the fact they are more opinionated, and possibly 
more frank, than other stakeholders. 
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Risk Analysis & the Risk Register 
We considered a significant amount of legislation, regulations, codes of practice and previous scandal when 
building the Risk Register.  In this section we consider each of these areas and add in the concerns gathered 
from the consultation to create a final Risk Register that can be seen in Table 1, complete with color-coding 
for severity.  
The following legislation and regulations were studied: 
 Data Protection Act 1998 [5] 
 Human Rights Act 1998 [2] 
 Draft Investigatory Powers Bill 2015 [7] 
 European General Data Protection Regulation [9] 
 Lawful Business Practice Regulation 2000 [10] 
 The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 [12] 
 Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations PECR [13] 
Data Protection Act 1998 [5] 
Let us consider the Data Protection Act 1998 first, and whether personal data is used by BioConnect or not.  
The data described in the information flows for BioConnect is clearly electronic data, which is one of the four 
data types the DPA concerns itself with [4, 5].  On its own, a MAC address cannot identify an individual.  
However, when we process it, and track it, then we learn something about the individual using that device, 
and we can say the data potentially could impact an individual in a personal, or business or professional 
capacity.  Facial recognition images are obviously about an individual as we are all unique inherently.  When 
we combine a facial recognition image and a MAC address, and then store this record with a unique ID, 
there is no doubt this is personal data for the purposes of the DPA.  This is also sensitive personal data as 
we may be able to tell race and ethnicity from the images.   
We can consider each of the eight principles of the DPA and if BioConnect is at risk of violating them.  For 
brevity we have not included the wording here in full, the DPA principles can be found in Appendix B. 
Principle 1 – we can fairly and lawfully process this data once the data subject has given his consent to 
processing.  In some cases, like a hostile environment or high security situations, the processing is 
necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject and would be necessary for the exercise of a 
related function of a government security department.  Since it is sensitive data, the data subject must give 
explicit consent to the process, or - in theory - we can process the data if consent was withheld, say in a high 
security or hostage situation.  We must be transparent that we are processing this data and we must get 
explicit consent when a user first gains access.  It must be considered how a user withdraws consent and 
the mechanism for this needs to be made clear when they sign-up. 
Principle 2 – it must be specified what the data is being obtained for and it must not be processed further 
than for that purpose.  Controlling potential new purposes of data is needed.  Not doing so could lead to 
discrimination or abuse of data, like gathering shopping or travel habits. 
Principle 3 – we are sure the data collection is not excessive.  BioConnect provides secure Wi-Fi and using a 
phone’s MAC address and a facial recognition image instead of, say, a username and a password, is 
adequate, relevant and the minimum required.  It is not possible to implement the project without these. 
Principle 4 – the data must be accurate and kept-up to date, bearing in mind if on occasion a user buys a 
new phone or if a device is sold as second hand device. 
Principle 5 – the data must not be kept longer than needed. 
Principle 6 – handling Subject Access Requests are important.  An example of poor handling of SARs would 
be not handling them in time. 
Principle 7 – appropriate technical and organisational measures have to be in place.  Facial recognition 
images and MAC addresses have to be protected.  They could be hacked in transmission. Insider threats are 
an issue. 
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Principle 8 – regarding the transfer of personal data, certain implementations of BioConnect may sit outside 
the EEA.  Countries outside the EEA may not enforce equivalent law and regulations as in the UK. 
Human Rights Act 1998 [2] 
BioConnect is not a core public authority.  However, in certain circumstances, we are required to act in line 
with the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), as we can be said to exercise a “function of a public nature”.  
Provision of Wi-Fi to potentially thousands of users in public spaces is clearly public in nature.  We feel 
security makes people feel safer, it is a social need, intrinsic to human beings.  As per Article 8 of the HRA, 
we respect everyone’s private and family life, home and correspondence.  BioConnect does not compel 
anyone to use it and consent can be withdrawn.   
Draft Investigatory Powers Bill (DIPB) 2015 [7] 
This bill almost certainly will become law before the end of 2016 [8] and needs consideration.  BioConnect 
can be seen as a Communications Service Provider (CSP) in the eyes of this bill.  Hence it is required that 
for 12 months we store the websites a user visits, though not the individual pages.  This requirement applies 
to all the other CSPs operating in the UK too.  BioConnect will be bound by this bill and will need to work with 
the police and authorities as needed.  Our attitude will be to set the best example possible if our help is 
required.  The Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009 [14] also has a similar stipulation to keep 
data for 12 months from the date of communication. 
European General Data Protection Regulation (EGDRP) [9] 
We need to be compliant with this in future when it is introduced in May 2018.  There is something of a 
conflict with the DIPB in that it increases power of the authorities in the UK whilst the EGDRP increases 
civilian power instead.  The EGDRP also requires PIAs to be undertaken, and is likely to be strongly against 
compulsory use of biometrics. 
Lawful Business Practice Regulation 2000 [10] 
This regulation applies to BioConnect if it is implemented in the workplace.  It allows monitoring and 
recording of communications in the interest of national security and to prevent and detect crime.  
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 [12] 
Perhaps surprisingly this Act allows agencies like the Environment Agency or the Food Standards Agency to 
use investigatory powers, not just well known national security services.  It could be said their application of 
the powers may not be as stringent as security services, so vigilance is needed. 
Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations (PECR) [13] 
These are extra rules that sit alongside the DPA and apply to any electronic communications service that is 
provided so as to be available for use by members of the public, such as BioConnect.  Similar to the DPA 
principle 7, measures must be taken to secure BioConnect and customers should be informed of the risks.  It 
also reminds us tracking location data requires consent, and there needs to be procedures for responding to 
other bodies who ask for personal data.  The ICO can check these procedures too. 
Other codes of practice & industry codes of conduct 
ICO guidance [6] states the use of surveillance systems for limited household purposes can be exempt from 
the DPA.  Still, it is sensible to take home use as seriously as other environments.  It points out that 
disclosing surveillance images of an individual, such as those generated by BioConnect, may intrude on 
others privacy if they are in the background.  [6] points out the ability to obscure the background of images is 
ideal and that staff should be appropriately trained.  Also, once information is disclosed to a 3rd party, they 
become responsible for the copy of the data they hold.  However, BioConnect could still get a negative public 
reaction if the 3rd party mishandles the information.  [6] also recommends carrying out a PIA and adhering to 
Privacy by Design (which we shall discuss later) when there is a chance that personal data will be pooled 
into big data systems, and states that automated recognition technologies attract the same data protection 
concerns.  They say the matching process should not be 100% automated, and recommend the results of 
automated matching should be monitored by trained individuals to ensure there haven’t been mismatches.   
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The ICO have also produced Wi-Fi location analytics guidance [16] which reinforces the fact that a MAC 
address can become personal data if combined with other information.  In the case of BioConnect this other 
information comprises facial recognition images.  It explains that probe requests from user devices when 
searching for a network (and before one is even joined) can have the MAC addresses extracted and stored.  
This can be seen as unnecessary collection of personal data if the user is not providing a facial recognition 
image as well to ultimately join the Wi-Fi network. 
Consideration of relevant IoT & surveillance scandals 
We need to be aware of the risk of false positives being generated by BioConnect.  For example, in the 2001 
Superbowl, facial biometrics were used to identify criminals, but twelve false positives (or false alarms) were 
generated.  There was a scandal where smart bins monitored the MAC addresses of mobile phones in 
London, and showed targeted content via advertising screens on the bins.  These were banned by the City 
of London and is a good example of transparency being needed to reduce possible negative reaction.  We 
can also consider the Nordstrom scandal, were they left it too late to inform customers they were tracking 
how customers navigated their stores, which resulted in negative press.  Big Brother Watch [11], a privacy 
rights campaign group, can also cause negative reactions with their challenges to law and policy along with 
public revelations about surveillance. 
Concerns uncovered through the consultations 
The consultations were useful in highlighting privacy risks and these were added to the Risk Register, 
referenced by used of (Rx) where x is a number. 
Stakeholder 1 – home owning female parent with children 
 Concerned that the Wi-Fi network itself has to be secure so sensitive data like banking information 
and photos can’t be compromised (R7).   
 Worried about the system tracking her location and storing pictures of her or her kids – so 
clarification is needed in the T&Cs, clear signage is needed, and explain the system is there for 
security and safety.  Again do not compel users to to use it (R1).  
 The positioning of the cameras could be intrusive.  But at the same time, they cannot be covert 
(R18).  
 Feels there is a risk sensitive pictures could be sent (R19).  Highlights the need not to compel people 
to use it, to be wary of data sharing, disclosure and unnecessary data.   
 Felt it was better to store data in the office rather than the cloud (R7).   
 Highlighted physical risk of being attacked by a criminal (R20) 
 They probably wouldn’t read the T&Cs (R1). 
Stakeholder 2 – business man who travels regularly 
 Also concerned about the transmission of data, again concerned that the Wi-Fi network has to be 
secure (R7). 
 Gave some validation to using BioConnect to track banned devices going onto planes, being “ok” 
with that data being stored but nothing extra, and expressed concern about too many photos being 
stored (R4, 5, 17, 19).   
 Wanted to be able to have info deleted on request and view / edit what was being stored about them 
(R1).  
 Concerned about tracking data being revealed publically and harming commercial relations (R5). 
 Also probably wouldn’t have time to read T&Cs (R1). 
Stakeholder 3 – internal member of BioConnect cyber security committee 
 Raised concerns about success in identifying falsified facial images (R21). 
 Recommended high-quality cameras be used but pointed out differences in mobile phone cameras 
compared to the installed cameras, and spoofing of MAC addresses (R22). 
 Also raised concerns about device constraints of IoT and their vulnerabilities (R7). 
 Suggested use of Role Based Access Control (RBAC) (R8). 
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Stakeholder 4 – tech savvy student who has been a victim of theft and whose parents were caught up in a 
terrorist attack 
 Concerned about personally sensitive info (R1).  
 Concerned about being able to delete information (R4, 5, 17, 19). 
 Raised prospect of blurring background images of people (R15).   
 Not comfortable with location tracking (R17).   
 Concerned about identifying faces also, i.e. false alarms (R21).    
 Concerned about insider threats, staff suitability (R8), how data is updated (R4) and stored (R7).  
 Feels that storing names and dates of birth are unnecessary, and after consideration we agree. 
This stakeholder also made an interesting point about storing the list of vulnerable devices and checking a 
phone’s MAC address against that, rather than storing all the phone’s MAC addresses.  This idea could be 
developed further in future.  They suggested too that the authorities should provide the criminal facial images 
for BioConnect to check against, instead of requesting access.  This is useful but we doubt it would be 
possible legally for the authorities to do that.   
Table 1 – The Risk Register 
Risk 
ID Privacy Issue Risk to Individuals 
Compliance 
Risk Associated Corporate Risk Likelihood Severity 
R1 
Obtaining 
Explicit Consent 
/ Awareness 
Unauthorised data 
processing 
DPA Principle 
1 
Reputational damage, loss 
of public trust and legal 
action. High High 
R2 
Withdrawing 
Explicit Consent 
Unauthorised data 
processing and data 
not being deleted 
DPA Principle 
1 
Reputational damage, loss 
of public trust and legal 
action. High High 
R3 
Further 
processing of 
data beyond 
original purpose 
Discrimination, 
aggressive marketing 
DPA Principle 
2 
Reputational damage, loss 
of public trust and legal 
action. Medium High 
R4 
Inaccurate / out-
of-date data 
Datastore 
compromised, privacy 
breaches, inaccurate 
identifications 
DPA Principle 
4 
Reputational damage, loss 
of public trust and legal 
action. Low Medium 
R5 
Data being held 
longer than 
needed 
Datastore 
compromised, privacy 
breaches.  
DPA Principle 
5 
Legal action.  Reputation 
damaged if deletion methods 
failing. Low Low 
R6 
Untimely or 
poor handling of 
SARs 
Unable to access 
their own personal 
data 
DPA Principle 
6 
Loss of public trust if SARs 
are regularly not handled 
properly, along with 
regulatory action Low Low 
R7 
Hacking of 
facial 
recognition 
images and 
MAC addresses Identity theft 
DPA Principle 
7 
Loss of public trust in the 
service, legal and regulatory 
action Low High 
R8 
Insider threats 
with regard 
datastore Identity theft 
DPA Principle 
7 
Loss of public trust in the 
service, legal and regulatory 
action, loss of sensitive 
corporate information Low High 
R9 
Non-EEA 
countries 
handling data Identity theft 
DPA Principle 
8 
Reputational damage, loss 
of public trust and legal 
action. Low High 
R10 
Discrimination 
through data 
sharing Discrimination 
HRA Article 
14 
Reputational damage, loss 
of public trust and legal 
action. Low High 
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R11 
Personal data 
and 
communications 
interception and 
equipment 
interference 
Data could be 
abused, loss of 
personal privacy DIPB 
Could be poor PR for 
BioConnect if this takes 
place in a specific 
investigation, as per the bill, 
and users did not know it 
was a possibility. Low Medium 
R12 
Mishandling of 
personal data Various 
EGDRP (from 
May 2018) 
Large financial penalties, 
bad press. Low Medium 
R13 
Interception of 
personal data 
Breach of personal 
privacy 
Lawful 
Business 
Practice 
Regulation 
2000 
Negative press - better to 
inform users upfront this 
may happen rather than only 
make reasonable efforts at 
the last minute to inform 
them Low Medium 
R14 
Secure 
communications 
Personal 
communications / 
information breached PECR 
Bad press, loss of faith in the 
service, regulatory action 
from the ICO Low Medium 
R15 
Individuals 
being identified 
in the 
background of 
surveillance 
images Various DPA 
Some reputational damage, 
possible legal / regulatory 
action Low Low 
R16 
3rd party 
mishandling 
disclosures Various N/A 
Bad press, PR, negative 
public perception Low Medium 
R17 
Unnecessary 
collection of 
MAC addresses 
as personal 
data 
Unauthorised data 
processing 
DPA Principle 
3 
Negative press if it was 
revealed this data was 
captured and not deleted 
promptly Medium High 
R18 
Installed 
camera 
placement Overly intrusive N/A 
Bad public perception.  
Legal action unlikely unless 
cameras are placed in 
toilets. Low Low 
R19 
Unnecessary 
collection of 
sensitive 
pictures at 
home Privacy intrusion HRA Article 8 
Legal action and loss of 
confidence from the public Medium High 
R20 
Criminals 
tracking users 
Individual physical 
attack N/A 
Negative public reaction.  
This is unlikely to happen 
though and objectively could 
occur with or without 
BioConnect being used. Low Medium 
R21 
False positives 
and deliberately 
falsified facial 
images 
Discrimination, 
embarrassment, 
identity theft HRA Article 8 
Reputational damage and 
major loss of faith in the 
system Low High 
R22 
MAC address 
spoofing by 
attackers 
Identity theft, data 
compromised DPA Article 7 
Legal and regulatory action, 
loss of confidence in the 
system and attacks on the 
system like DDoS. Low High 
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Proposed Solutions 
For each risk, a solution was proposed and these can be seen in Table 2 below.  Each solution can be 
traced back to match against the original risk.  Following ICO guidance, it is important our solutions adhere 
to Privacy by Design principles [17, 18], which we shall discuss next. 
Table 2 – Proposed Solutions 
Solution 
ID 
Risk 
ID Privacy Issue Proposed Solution Details 
S1 R1 
Obtaining Explicit 
Consent / Awareness 
Explicit consent must be sought via the device when a user first signs up.  Be 
clear with the T&Cs and use a layered approach as suggested in [6] with users 
urged to read full terms and conditions available via a link.  Also [16] suggests 
the use of QR codes to provide T&Cs and on the BioConnect website allow a 
user to enter their MAC address and upload a facial image as a form of 
authentication to be able to view, edit and delete information already stored on 
them.  Also put up signs in the environment at entrances and re-inforce the 
message further in. [6] rightly states that using signs are important where 
people might not expect to be under surveillance. 
S2 R2 
Withdrawing Explicit 
Consent 
Place a consent withdrawal mechanism on the same screen or page used to 
sign-up on the device.  If this consent is withdrawn, all the data relating to that 
person is automatically deleted, apart from their internet browsing history 
which all CSPs in the UK are required to keep for 12 months as per [7] and 
[14]. 
S3 R3 
Further processing of 
data beyond original 
purpose 
Be vigilant with BioConnect clients, partners and resellers, possibly restrict 
territory sales.  It is hard to picture this being a regular occurrence, so it is also 
something of an acceptable risk. 
S4 R4 
Inaccurate / out-of-date 
data 
This can be dealt with in the main by digital forgetting or automatic deletion of 
records so any changes in device or appearance are handled on the next new 
sign-up.  For specific problems the trained security team can be contacted by 
the user via email or a web form. 
S5 R5 
Data being held longer 
than needed 
This is a difficult risk to remove completely.  As a CSP, BioConnect have to 
keep internet browsing records for 12 months.  At the time same, we do not 
want to keep MAC addresses or facial images any longer than is necessary.  
An automatic deletion policy for MAC addresses and facial images would likely 
contradict with the legal requirement to keep internet records.  However, the 
MAC addresses gathered from Wi-Fi probe requests could be stored 
separately and then deleted daily.  Recall user data must be deleted when 
consent is withdrawn though deleting all data would not be possible if the user 
has used the service to browse the web, as per the legal requirement already 
mentioned.  The security team for this work have to be trained and reliable, 
with logging of deletions taking place. 
S6 R6 
Untimely or poor 
handling of SARs 
The data controller's details need to be readily available to the user, with a 
team trained to handle SARs.  The SARs themselves can be made via the 
website or in writing to the BioConnect headquarters.  So we can explicitly put 
a link to a SAR form on the BioConnect website and direct people to it on 
printed material too. 
S7 R7 
Hacking of facial 
recognition images and 
MAC addresses 
Use a secure tunnelled VPN in the network for transferring this data, encrypt 
the database using a sufficiently strong algorithm, and chose the best 
encryption method for the data itself when being transferred bearing in mind 
IoT power constraints.  Invest time and effort upfront selecting IoT cameras (or 
even developing in-house) with enough embedded processing power and 
memory for secure encryption - amend the information flow so that images are 
only stored in IoT cameras in an encrypted format, not unencrypted, as this 
poses a vulnerability before transmission.  Implement both secure cloud 
storage and secure physical storage, the choice will depend on the 
implementation.  Consider empowering the user to choose storage option. 
S8 R8 
Insider threats with 
regard datastore 
The security teams handling the data and the processes will be vetted, reliable 
and trained.  Network access will be restricted with restrictions placed on 
hardware also, such as having no USB ports on the machines being used in a 
control room.  Security measures like having no mobile devices or USB pens 
in the control room can be put in place.  Monitor networks internally for 
suspicious insider threat activity and implement Role Based Access Control 
(RBAC).  Implement a combined Intrusion Detection & Prevention System 
(IDPS). 
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S9 R9 
Non-EEA countries 
handling data 
For us to partner with one of these non EEA countries, we will seek impartial 
3rd party legal advisors to work with both our legal team and that of the 
potential partners.  If the law is not sufficiently strong in the potential territory, 
then it is best not to proceed with an arrangement. 
S10 R10 
Discrimination through 
data sharing 
Article 14 of the HRA relates to prohibition of discrimination.  Via sharing data 
with law enforcement or other agencies, this is a risk.  This data sharing can 
take place in exceptional circumstances, such as matters of national security, 
or prevention of disorder or crime.  We have to manage this process, be 
transparent and be vigilant that standards are being adhered to.  
S11 R11 
Personal data and 
communications 
interception and 
equipment interference 
Be transparent.  Mention in our terms & conditions very clearly that this may 
happen and we are legally obliged to assist authorities. 
S12 R12 
Mishandling of personal 
data 
To comply with the forthcoming EGDRIP, make sure we have a data 
protection officer.  Bear in mind a first written warning is provided before a 
penalty is imposed, so there is more margin for error to begin with as the 
regulation is implemented. 
S13 R13 
Interception of personal 
data 
Make sure in the terms & conditions for users it is clear upfront this may 
happen, rather than only make reasonable efforts at the last minute to inform 
them. 
S14 R14 Secure communications 
Implement a breach log, make sure opting in is required as much as possible - 
that is, opted out should be a default stance ideally. 
S15 R15 
Individuals being 
identified in the 
background of 
surveillance images 
Implementing face obscuring technology via a 3rd party is an option however it 
is considered minimal public intrusion to be in the background, given the 
nature of images posted on social media for example.  It could also be costly.  
So, accept this risk. 
S16 R16 
3rd party mishandling 
disclosures As part of the disclosure process, check the best practice of the 3rd party. 
S17 R17 
Unnecessary collection 
of MAC addresses as 
personal data 
Set up a terminal at entrances to read the MAC address of a device and offer 
opt-in or opt-out of address collection.  Explain clearly on signs this is to 
reduce data collection.  Daily deletion of these basic Wi-Fi probe requests so 
data is not held unnecessarily.   
S18 R18 
Installed camera 
placement 
Take care when designing system layout, conduct further consultations with 
stakeholders to define intrusive areas in each environment. 
S19 R19 
Unnecessary collection 
of sensitive pictures at 
home 
Make sure home installations can be easily switched off by the user, and 
include some physical screen that can be opened and closed on home 
cameras. 
S20 R20 Criminals tracking users Have the client consider extra security personnel on the ground. 
S21 R21 
False positives and 
deliberately falsified 
facial images 
Invest in high quality cameras and lighting, do not compromise, and make sure 
to set review dates for installations 
S22 R22 
MAC address spoofing 
by attackers 
Ensure technical mitigation by checking new information against a stored 
profile to detect device changes relating to a MAC address. 
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Privacy by Design 
The ICO states Privacy by Design is an approach to projects that promotes privacy and data protection 
compliance from the start.  Although this approach is not a requirement of the DPA, it helps organisations 
comply with their obligations under the legislation [18].  This PIA document in an inherent part therefore of a 
Privacy by Design approach.  There are seven core principles of Privacy by Design [17].  Here we list the 
principles and give examples of how the proposed solutions meet the principles: 
1. Proactive not Reactive; Preventative not Remedial 
As stated, this very PIA document is proactive as we wish to prevent risks from occurring rather than waiting 
until afterwards to deal with them. 
2. Privacy as the Default Setting 
BioConnect will require explicit consent to use the system.  We strive to make sure every user’s privacy 
remains intact if they do not give this explicit consent, for example by deleting records of Wi-Fi probe 
requests. 
3. Privacy Embedded into Design 
We do not wish to compromise or diminish functionality, privacy is integral to the system.  BioConnect are 
prepared to invest time and effort into selecting the correct core components to adhere to this principle.  For 
example, either choosing best-in-class IoT cameras for implementations, or shaping that landscape 
ourselves with our own in-house research and development into how to overcome IoT device resource 
constraints. 
4. Full Functionality – Positive-Sum, not Zero-Sum 
BioConnect will try to avoid unnecessary trade-offs between all affected parties.  The classic example here is 
tackling the issue of keeping people secure versus collecting personal data with a view to achieving that 
exact purpose.  They appear to be at odds with each other but by being thorough and carefully considering 
consultations, security and privacy do not need to be juxtaposed. 
5. End-to-End Security – Full Lifecycle Protection 
Our end-to-end protection starts with explicit consent being required, followed by data being securely 
encrypted and securely transferred to the datastore.  This datastore is also secured and is only handled by 
suitable personnel.  Deletion processes are maintained and logged to avoid storing data unnecessarily.  We 
expect 3rd parties who request our data to uphold the same high standards. 
6. Visibility and Transparency – Keep it Open 
We will be clear in our T&Cs with what sensitive personal data is being processed, and why.  This 
explanation includes the security and safety benefits as well as the legal requirements.  We will also be 
upfront about stating in future we could be obliged to comply with investigations into matters of national 
security or crime. 
7. Respect for User Privacy – Keep it User-Centric 
Empowering users is important.  Again, BioConnect does not compel users to use its Wi-Fi service.  We 
strive to inform them of the service risks and policies through layered T&Cs and physical notices in their 
environment.  This is key where users would not expect data to be collected and processed.  With those 
purchasing implementations, we can give them recommendations and choices for how they wish data to be 
stored.  Some small but important design aspects can be undertaken like physical shutters to cover a 
camera lens at home, making sure equipment can be turned off (Microsoft’s Kinect IoT device received bad 
press in the past in this regard [19]) and not providing audio recording facilities [6]. 
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Summary of Solutions 
It is impossible to remove all risks in their entirety as no environment is risk-free.  We are confident the 
solutions proposed are realistic in the whole however there is always the chance that an attacker may be 
more powerful than the IoT network itself and compromise it, or that they use that computing power to break 
any encryption on datastores.   
IoT technology has not matured and there are vulnerabilities caused by resource constraints and a lack of 
standards compared to traditional IP.  However, these risks are not insurmountable.  Lightweight protocols, 
encryption methods and the correct selection of topologies contribute to adopting a best-in-class approach in 
line with the Privacy by Design principles, particularly numbers 3, 4 and 5. 
False positives are always going to be a risk – 100% accuracy with biometrics is unattainable.  Hence we 
recommend human involvement to handle mismatches as the system cannot be fully automated. 
PIA Outcomes 
With the potential scope of the system and its complexity, we propose that a robust sign-off procedure is 
adopted for both individual project implementations, and research and development.  The Risk Register is a 
core part of this.  Addressing risk, however, is a continual process and this register has to be maintained.  
We suggest scheduled bi-monthly reviews of each implementation and daily monitoring of industry press for 
zero-day threats that might affect our systems.   
This PIA recommends that all of the solutions apart from S15 and S20 are implemented.  S15 regards 
implementing face obscuring technology for background faces when capturing a foreground image but this is 
not essential and there is little difference between this and photos shared via social media.  S20 relates to 
reducing actual physical harm to users via the client having an extra security presence – it is very likely that 
other physical threats that are outside of any made possible by using BioConnect have caused a suitable 
security presence on the ground to be set already.   
When the risk register is studied there are a significant number of risks with high severity and low likelihood 
but nevertheless they cannot be ignored, hence our recommendation that the remainder of the solutions 
should be implemented.  In conclusion, BioConnect can directly help deal with a number of society’s security 
problems through technology - some of these solutions individually may be resource intensive or costly, but 
nevertheless, on balance when considering the whole solution and potential impact, these solutions and the 
project in the whole are worthy investments.    
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Appendices 
Appendix A – Stakeholder Questionnaires & Answers 
Appendix A1 – Questionnaires sent out and responses received 
Stakeholder 1 – you are a home-owning female parent, 40 years-old, with two children under the age 
of 10 years-old.  You have various devices at home that could use this system though you are not 
particularly tech-savvy.  Also, you use public transport regularly both on your own and sometimes 
bring your children.   Please carefully consider the product information below, and then answer the 
questions.  Thank you in advance! 
 
BioConnect 
 
BioConnect is a new product that uses a combination of facial recognition and a mobile phone MAC address 
tracking for authorising access to Wi-Fi.  The system requires user consent to access the Wi-Fi unless they 
have already given their consent via previous use. 
 
It is envisaged BioConnect is most beneficial in three main areas: 
 
1.  At home 
2.  On travel networks 
3.  In large public, private or hostile environments.  For example, sports venues, office buildings or security 
situations respectively. 
 
Example usage:  
 
- in the home for controlled Wi-Fi access to prevent unauthorised use of devices, for example by children.  
- in public places to reduce device theft and help catch thieves 
- across a regional or international travel network incorporating subways, buses, train stations, airports and 
such like.  It may be particularly useful for helping to secure large travel networks which may under terrorist 
threat, like the London Underground. 
- locating individuals under some kind of time pressure, for example those who are late for a flight, or in more 
severe circumstances trying to pin-point terrorists inside a building where hostages are being held. 
- in retail stores for tracking customer movements 
- in buildings for tracking who in inside or outside 
- for specific surveillance e.g. on travel networks, sports stadiums, entertainment parks, universities, schools, 
workplaces, supermarkets, conferences and events with controlled access, for example via turnstiles.   This 
helps reduces risks of crime and terrorist attacks in venues and environments with a high density of people. 
 
Functionality: 
 
In order to join a Wi-Fi network, the system requires a picture of the user’s face.  The first time a user joins a 
network, this is stored with the MAC address of the device attempting to access the Wi-Fi in a central cloud-
based datastore.  Consider a MAC address to be a unique ID for each phone.  Once a facial image and MAC 
address are recorded for a given device, the next time access is attempted, the image of the user must 
match the original capture.  When a user returns to an environment where they have previously used the Wi-
Fi and requests access once more, the system will check their face against the stored picture, and if the 
MAC address matches the stored MAC address, then Wi-Fi access will be granted.   
 
In most cases it is thought the camera in the device attempting access will be used to take the picture.  
Alternatively, it can be taken via the installed cameras in the environment.  For example, a camera in a 
user’s house, or via a special kiosk camera in public, or cameras installed in the back of seats on a train.  
These cameras can be installed wherever the customer requests.   
 
A user can leave a network and re-join it easily.  An installed camera can automatically check the user’s face 
and mobile phone MAC address when Wi-Fi access is requested, and if there is a match with the data 
already stored then access is granted.   
 
In a home situation for example this prevents children using parent’s devices.  In other environments, if 
required, it is possible to alert an authority if a previously registered device attempts access and the image of 
the individual does not match that which is stored.  This authority could be an on-site administrator, or a 
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security team.  In environments where the datastore is shared with official security services, they can be 
notified also, for example if a known criminal or terror suspect is identified.  
 
The system can track users in an environment via their phone’s MAC address.  People can also be tracked 
via their facial image.  For example, in an airport if a connected device is stationary for an abnormal period of 
time, security can be notified and it can be investigated.  The MAC address allows the specific model of 
device to be identified.  For example, Samsung Galaxy Note 7 devices, which at time of writing are 
vulnerable to catching fire, have been banned by the US Department of Transportation from being carried 
onto a plane either in hand luggage or checked-in luggage. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. What activities do you use Wi-Fi for that you would consider to be sensitive or personal?  
Sensitive activities which I would use Wi-Fi for are banking, sending messages using online apps, sharing 
photos with friends and browsing the internet. 
2. What, if any, information would you be worried or uncomfortable about the system recording?  Please 
describe what that information would be and why it would concern you.  
I would be worried about the system tracking my location as I don’t know who would have access to that and 
what it would be used for. I would not be comfortable using this system outside my home if it tracked my 
location. I also would not feel comfortable with this system storing pictures of me or my kids and would hate 
having a camera in the seat in front of me sending pictures to a server which people could access. 
3. What concerns would you have over your children either intentionally or accidentally using the system at 
a) home b) in public? 
A) I would not feel comfortable at all giving a system access to a camera in my home which would send 
pictures of to a server. The risk of sensitive pictures being sent is too high. 
b) I would not feel comfortable with a system tracking my kids in public or taking pictures of them any time 
they access wifi. 
4. Do you think having any age checking as part of the system would be valuable?  For example, to make 
sure only over 18s were using the system.  
No, I do not think blocking access to wifi based on age would be beneficial. I think for applying parental 
controls to internet access for kids the restriction would need to be more application specific as total ban on 
internet wouldn’t solve anything. 
5. In future would you be comfortable with any data being shared with other parties if we genuinely felt it 
would benefit you? 
No I would not be comfortable with you sharing my data at your discretion. I would not feel comfortable with 
more data being connected than was necessary for authentication.  
6. Even if you rarely or never used the service, how much would you care if it was installed in environments 
you travelled through? 
I would not be comfortable with cameras being installed in public places for this system as I don’t believe 
they would have enough oversight. I would be ok with the system being installed if it only used the device 
cameras or booths. The tacking system would also need approval before it logged any information. 
7. Would how often you use the service affect how you felt about us storing your data?  For example, visiting 
somewhere on a weekend break compared to passing through several train stations to and from work each 
day? 
 Yes I would be more willing to have some data stored if It made daily life better however I would not be as 
comfortable with places I don’t often visit. 
8. A cloud computing system stores information online instead of actually in a large computer in an office.  
How do you feel about your data being stored online in the cloud compared to on physical servers? 
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I feel that having my information in the cloud would make it less secure than it being in a specific office and 
also more accessible to people who wouldn’t need access. 
9. Tracking individuals and devices helps us identify people of interest, and devices that may be a threat.  
Would this tracking activity concern you, and if so why? 
Yes, I don’t think a private company who’s purpose is to provide wifi access to be should have the capability 
or right to track peoples locations in public locations. If the system was in a private building and the tracking 
was optional then I think this feature would be ok. 
10. To make system more secure we were considering asking for a user’s date of birth and name as well on 
first registration so we can personalise the service.  Would you be happy to provide these details to make the 
system more secure?  Please discuss any concerns you might have also. 
Yes I would be ok with sharing this information if it was stored securely. The main reason I do not disagree 
with this is that it is displayed publicly on social media and most websites ask for this information. 
11. With this system it is possible your facial image may be recorded in the background when the system is 
analysing a person in the foreground.  How would you feel about that? 
I would be ok with this as long as these images aren’t stored for longer than is necessary to analyse them 
and that they aren’t shared. This is a daily occurs with selfies so that is why I would be ok with just their 
capture 
12. Storing facial images and phone MAC address speeds up accessing Wi-Fi where this system is installed, 
as then a user doesn’t need to provide a facial image each time.  How long would you be happy for us to 
keep this data for before it is deleted? 
I think for frequently accessed locations I think it should be a month after the last access request and for 
once off location I think it should be two weeks after last access request. 
13. In certain circumstances we may need to share our data with the security services to help apprehend 
criminals.  Would you have any concerns over this? 
I would have concerns over the scale of the shared data. If data for a particular location and time and person 
this would be ok but not if sharing information on every customer was the practice for any request. 
14. Would you have any physical privacy concerns using the system?  Physical privacy risks are not those 
risks pertaining to your information, but those related directly to physical harm being caused to you. 
I would have concerns with staff in your company having the ability to turn on cameras or track my location. I 
think this would be dangerous if a stalker other form on criminal managed to get access to your systems. 
15. if we had a code of practice or terms, realistically would you read them?  What would stop or discourage 
you from reading them? 
They are typically very long and written using legal terminology which makes them hard to understand and 
so I would likely not read them. Also If I was connecting to wifi on the go I would likely not have the time to 
read these conditions. 
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Stakeholder 2 – you are a senior business executive that travels internationally daily by air and by 
train.  When you travel you also use your laptop, tablet and mobile device for business use and 
personal use.  Please carefully consider the product information below, and then answer the 
questions.  Thank you in advance! 
BioConnect 
 
BioConnect is a new product that uses a combination of facial recognition and a mobile phone MAC address 
tracking for authorising access to Wi-Fi.  The system requires user consent to access the Wi-Fi unless they 
have already given their consent via previous use. 
 
It is envisaged BioConnect is most beneficial in three main areas: 
 
1.  At home 
2.  On travel networks 
3.  In large public, private or hostile environments.  For example, sports venues, office buildings or security 
situations respectively. 
 
Example usage:  
 
- in the home for controlled Wi-Fi access to prevent unauthorised use of devices, for example by children.  
- in public places to reduce device theft and help catch thieves 
- across a regional or international travel network incorporating subways, buses, train stations, airports and 
such like.  It may be particularly useful for helping to secure large travel networks which may under terrorist 
threat, like the London Underground. 
- locating individuals under some kind of time pressure, for example those who are late for a flight, or in more 
severe circumstances trying to pin-point terrorists inside a building where hostages are being held. 
- in retail stores for tracking customer movements 
- in buildings for tracking who in inside or outside 
- for specific surveillance e.g. on travel networks, sports stadiums, entertainment parks, universities, schools, 
workplaces, supermarkets, conferences and events with controlled access, for example via turnstiles.   This 
helps reduces risks of crime and terrorist attacks in venues and environments with a high density of people. 
 
Functionality: 
 
In order to join a Wi-Fi network, the system requires a picture of the user’s face.  The first time a user joins a 
network, this is stored with the MAC address of the device attempting to access the Wi-Fi in a central cloud-
based datastore.  Consider a MAC address to be a unique ID for each phone.  Once a facial image and MAC 
address are recorded for a given device, the next time access is attempted, the image of the user must 
match the original capture.  When a user returns to an environment where they have previously used the Wi-
Fi and requests access once more, the system will check their face against the stored picture, and if the 
MAC address matches the stored MAC address, then Wi-Fi access will be granted.   
 
In most cases it is thought the camera in the device attempting access will be used to take the picture.  
Alternatively, it can be taken via the installed cameras in the environment.  For example, a camera in a 
user’s house, or via a special kiosk camera in public, or cameras installed in the back of seats on a train.  
These cameras can be installed wherever the customer requests.   
 
A user can leave a network and re-join it easily.  An installed camera can automatically check the user’s face 
and mobile phone MAC address when Wi-Fi access is requested, and if there is a match with the data 
already stored then access is granted.   
 
In a home situation for example this prevents children using parent’s devices.  In other environments, if 
required, it is possible to alert an authority if a previously registered device attempts access and the image of 
the individual does not match that which is stored.  This authority could be an on-site administrator, or a 
security team.  In environments where the datastore is shared with official security services, they can be 
notified also, for example if a known criminal or terror suspect is identified.  
 
The system can track users in an environment via their phone’s MAC address.  People can also be tracked 
via their facial image.  For example, in an airport if a connected device is stationary for an abnormal period of 
time, security can be notified and it can be investigated.  The MAC address allows the specific model of 
device to be identified.  For example, Samsung Galaxy Note 7 devices, which at time of writing are 
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vulnerable to catching fire, have been banned by the US Department of Transportation from being carried 
onto a plane either in hand luggage or checked-in luggage. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. What activities do you use Wi-Fi for that you would consider to be sensitive or personal? 
I use Wi-Fi both at home and in public to both work and personal emails. The carry personal information like 
email address, phone number, name and address of both myself, colleagues and customers. Customer’s 
information is particularly sensitive. The content of the emails may also be confidential. I also access my 
company’s network via Wi-Fi, this involves lots of confidential information being sent and received. 
2. How important is using Wi-Fi whilst you are away from your desk in your office, or when travelling? 
It is of the upmost importance. I spend a lot of work time away from my desk and need to be able to 
communicate with colleagues and customers. 
3. Some mobile phone devices may pose a problem, like those which can catch fire.  Recently the Samsung 
Galaxy Note 7 was banned from all US flights as it was deemed to pose a danger.  Would you want to know 
if someone had brought a banned model onto a plane?  How would you feel about your device model 
information being stored? 
I would want to know if someone brought a banned model onto a plane I was on. I would feel slightly 
uncomfortable but ok with it so long as it was just information on the phone model being stored. I would have 
concerns about other information being stored as well. 
4. If you were a regular user of the system, say multiple times per day, how would you feel about explicitly 
giving consent to use the system every single time?  For example, would having to provide a new picture 
every time be irritating? 
 
Yes, once I am connected to a Wi-Fi, I should stay connected until I leave. I could tolerate providing a photo 
once per day but more than that seems excessive. 
 
5. How important to you would it be to be able to access, edit or delete the information we store regarding 
you and your device? 
It is important that the information be deleted if I request it. I would also want to be able to see what 
information is being stored about me and request that certain parts be deleted. 
6. What, if any, information would you be worried or uncomfortable about the system recording?  Please 
describe what that information would be and why it would concern you. 
Email address, I get enough span email as it is. It also does not seem to be necessary for it to be stored. 
Phone number, I get too many phone calls currently. It does not appear to be necessary for my phone 
number to be stored. 
A history of places I have accessed the Wi-Fi. Sometimes I meet with potential clients before we have an 
official partnership. I would be uncomfortable with this information being made public. 
7. Tracking individuals and devices helps us identify people of interest, and devices that may be a threat.  
Would this tracking activity concern you, and if so why? 
Yes, as mentioned above I often need meetings with potential clients to be confidential. 
8. What differences, if any, do you feel there are between using a chipped passport and facial recognition 
when you are travelling through an airport, and using our system for Wi-Fi access? 
This system seems to extend beyond airports. However I do have similar concerns with regards to my 
movement being tracked. 
9. To make system more secure we were considering asking for a user’s date of birth and name as well on 
first registration so we can personalise the service.  Would you be happy to provide these details to make the 
system more secure?  Please discuss any concerns you might have also. 
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So long as a history of locations I have accessed the Wi-Fi is not being kept, I would have no problem with 
providing this information. 
10. Would you feel safer in an airport knowing that we can investigate behaviour that seems out-of-the 
ordinary? 
Yes, so long as tracking information is not being stored longer than necessary. 
11. How concerned would you be about the possible collection of other data apart from your facial image and 
phone’s MAC address as an unavoidable by-product of using the system?  Presume this other data would 
simply be stored and not used for any other purpose. 
Very concerned, as mentioned before I do not want my location history to be made public. 
12. Storing facial images and phone MAC address speeds up accessing Wi-Fi where this system is installed, 
as then a user doesn’t need to provide a facial image each time.  How long would you be happy for us to 
keep this data for before it is deleted? 
If I am using the service almost daily I would be comfortable with the images and MAC address being stored 
permanently, so long as no other information is also being stored. 
13. Sharing the information we store could prevent terrorist attacks.  Would you feel safer knowing that your 
travel route is being monitored for criminals and suspects? 
So long as only people who the police have genuine reason to believe are terrorists are being monitored. 
14. Generally, do you read terms and conditions of Wi-Fi or other digital online services you use?   Please 
explain why you do, or why you don’t. 
No, I don’t think it is important enough to spend the time. 
15. And if we had a code of practice or terms, realistically would you read them?  Again what would stop or 
discourage you from reading them? 
I would probably not read them, I would likely be in a rush to get connected to the W-Fi. 
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Stakeholder 3 – you sit on the internal cyber security committee of BioConnect.  You previously were 
an ethical hacker and worked as a contractor to strengthen vulnerable systems.  From time to time 
you also appear as a guest in the media to discuss cyber security incidents.  Please carefully 
consider the product information below, and then answer the questions.  Thank you in advance! 
BioConnect 
 
BioConnect is a new product that uses a combination of facial recognition and a mobile phone MAC address 
tracking for authorising access to Wi-Fi.  The system requires user consent to access the Wi-Fi unless they 
have already given their consent via previous use. 
 
It is envisaged BioConnect is most beneficial in three main areas: 
 
1.  At home 
2.  On travel networks 
3.  In large public, private or hostile environments.  For example, sports venues, office buildings or security 
situations respectively. 
 
Example usage:  
 
- in the home for controlled Wi-Fi access to prevent unauthorised use of devices, for example by children.  
- in public places to reduce device theft and help catch thieves 
- across a regional or international travel network incorporating subways, buses, train stations, airports and 
such like.  It may be particularly useful for helping to secure large travel networks which may under terrorist 
threat, like the London Underground. 
- locating individuals under some kind of time pressure, for example those who are late for a flight, or in more 
severe circumstances trying to pin-point terrorists inside a building where hostages are being held. 
- in retail stores for tracking customer movements 
- in buildings for tracking who in inside or outside 
- for specific surveillance e.g. on travel networks, sports stadiums, entertainment parks, universities, schools, 
workplaces, supermarkets, conferences and events with controlled access, for example via turnstiles.   This 
helps reduces risks of crime and terrorist attacks in venues and environments with a high density of people. 
 
Functionality: 
 
In order to join a Wi-Fi network, the system requires a picture of the user’s face.  The first time a user joins a 
network, this is stored with the MAC address of the device attempting to access the Wi-Fi in a central cloud-
based datastore.  Consider a MAC address to be a unique ID for each phone.  Once a facial image and MAC 
address are recorded for a given device, the next time access is attempted, the image of the user must 
match the original capture.  When a user returns to an environment where they have previously used the Wi-
Fi and requests access once more, the system will check their face against the stored picture, and if the 
MAC address matches the stored MAC address, then Wi-Fi access will be granted.   
 
In most cases it is thought the camera in the device attempting access will be used to take the picture.  
Alternatively, it can be taken via the installed cameras in the environment.  For example, a camera in a 
user’s house, or via a special kiosk camera in public, or cameras installed in the back of seats on a train.  
These cameras can be installed wherever the customer requests.   
 
A user can leave a network and re-join it easily.  An installed camera can automatically check the user’s face 
and mobile phone MAC address when Wi-Fi access is requested, and if there is a match with the data 
already stored then access is granted.   
 
In a home situation for example this prevents children using parent’s devices.  In other environments, if 
required, it is possible to alert an authority if a previously registered device attempts access and the image of 
the individual does not match that which is stored.  This authority could be an on-site administrator, or a 
security team.  In environments where the datastore is shared with official security services, they can be 
notified also, for example if a known criminal or terror suspect is identified.  
 
The system can track users in an environment via their phone’s MAC address.  People can also be tracked 
via their facial image.  For example, in an airport if a connected device is stationary for an abnormal period of 
time, security can be notified and it can be investigated.  The MAC address allows the specific model of 
device to be identified.  For example, Samsung Galaxy Note 7 devices, which at time of writing are 
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vulnerable to catching fire, have been banned by the US Department of Transportation from being carried 
onto a plane either in hand luggage or checked-in luggage. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Do you think it is reasonable to ask a user to only provide their facial image to the system once on initial 
registration, and then again after some set time period has passed (like a few months), compared to asking 
them to provide a facial image every single time they wish to access the system? 
 
In my opinion this would depend on how and where the system was implemented. For example in most 
cases providing a facial image every few months would be sufficient for most public venues, such as retail 
stores, universities and schools. However facial images should be more regularly required where controlled 
access is used (e.g. turnstiles). Facial images should be required most regularly in situations where the 
threat of terrorism is seen to be high, such as travel networks, including airports, international rail networks 
and city subways. 
 
2. To make system more secure we were considering asking for a user’s date of birth and name as well on 
first registration so we can personalise the service.   Do you feel this data is commonly provided by the public 
already, and – if we decided to implement a requirement for a user’s date of birth and name – would we be 
asking them to do anything they don’t do already? 
Again I feel that this may be subjective to how and where the system is implemented, however considering 
the user is willing to provide a facial image there may be fewer objections to providing this additional 
information. In cases where free service is provided (e.g. free internet access) most users will provide this 
information. 
3. From the description of the system, and your own experience, please describe any vulnerabilities you feel 
might exist.  For example, in relation to the cameras we might use, the collection process of the facial 
images, the MAC addresses, and also how they are stored. 
One of my main concerns regarding this system would be its accuracy and how effectively it could identify 
falsified facial images. For this reason I would recommend high quality cameras in the IoT devices, this may 
be more difficult to manage however, where identification of users is carried out with personal mobile 
devices, where variation in camera sensors can be significant. Another concern would be the possible 
spoofing of MAC addresses on mobile devices, which when paired with a falsified facial image could provide 
a false identity for the user. Storage of personal data including names and dates of birth along with Images 
and MAC addresses should always be a primary concern for those implementing this system, and every 
possible measure should be taken to prevent the theft of this data. 
4. We are aware that it can be difficult to encrypt data being transmitted over IoT as it uses constrained 
devices with little memory and CPU power.   Should we be concerned about this, and can you make any 
recommendations in this area? 
This should be a major concern for those adopting this system, especially when it is being implemented in a 
public place, including transport infrastructure, sports venues, schools, universities and retail complexes. 
This issue has the potential to allow attackers to intercept unencrypted communications which would contain 
personal data. My recommendation regarding this would be to invest in more powerful IoT devices for 
implementations where security is paramount, including transport infrastructure (e.g. airports and subways 
etc.) allowing strong encryption methods to be used. For instances where security is not as critical, a solution 
may be to utilise lightweight encryption methods for the devices. 
5. We expect users will want to know about how data can be protected in case it falls into the wrong hands 
or is leaked.  In your experience does this happen regularly, and can you suggest any mitigations? 
In my experience, situations such as this occur on a regular basis, however in most cases the information 
has not been handled correctly or sufficiently protected. I would suggest that measures be taken to both 
protect data against external threats (system hardening, data encryption etc.) and internal threats with 
implementation of RBAC. This will decrease the likelihood that personal data stored by the system can be 
divulged by an unauthorised user. 
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6. Is there any way we could protect the data so it could not be read or used if it was leaked? 
Yes – To ensure the data cannot be read if a breach occurs it should be stored in an encrypted database, 
various different standards exist which could provide acceptable levels of protection for stored data. Data 
should also be encrypted during transmission to ensure that intercepted data cannot be read if intercepted, I 
would also recommend ensuring that all network application layers are also encrypted as standard. 
7. Should we be concerned about using cloud storage instead of on-site physical servers? 
The use of cloud storage can spark many concerns regarding the privacy and security of user data. These 
can include threats from attacks against the service provider, threat of data released by disgruntled 
employees etc. However these fears can be addressed by encrypting the data using encryption keys 
unknown by the data host, therefore ensuring the data is not viewable by their employees. If BioConnect 
intends to roll out their product on a large scale it may be worthwhile investing in their own cloud 
infrastructure therefore giving them more control over their data. 
8. Are there any advantages / disadvantages to user data being stored in the cloud compared to physical 
servers? 
There are various advantages and disadvantages in utilising cloud based storage over on-site servers. One 
such disadvantage of cloud storage is that a measure of control over the data is relinquished when using a 
cloud hosted solution, and this can lead to threats such as the ones mentioned in Q7. However cloud 
storage can provide greater efficiency and availability to the customer organisations using the BioConnect 
system than an on-site server could. This would lead me to believe that it would be more practical to 
implement a cloud based solution providing sufficient security measures were put in place. 
9. We still have to fully consider how long we are storing customer data for.  What thoughts do you have with 
regard what is reasonable? 
In my opinion BioConnect should adhere as closely as possible to the Data Protection Act of 1998 when 
forming the policies surrounding customer data storage. I would recommend consulting with a lawyer to 
address the finer points of this, and to prepare for any imminent changes which may occur to this legislation. 
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Stakeholder 4 – you are a 23-year-old tech savvy university student living in London.  You are 
something of a fair-weather protester with regard to privacy and human rights but they are still 
important to you, and you attend rallies when you can.  You’ve been the victim of phone theft in the 
past and your parents were caught up in the London Underground bombing in 2005, although they 
were not harmed.  Please carefully consider the product information below, and then answer the 
questions.  Thank you in advance! 
BioConnect 
 
BioConnect is a new product that uses a combination of facial recognition and a mobile phone MAC address 
tracking for authorising access to Wi-Fi.  The system requires user consent to access the Wi-Fi unless they 
have already given their consent via previous use. 
 
It is envisaged BioConnect is most beneficial in three main areas: 
 
1.  At home 
2.  On travel networks 
3.  In large public, private or hostile environments.  For example, sports venues, office buildings or security 
situations respectively. 
 
Example usage:  
 
- in the home for controlled Wi-Fi access to prevent unauthorised use of devices, for example by children.  
- in public places to reduce device theft and help catch thieves 
- across a regional or international travel network incorporating subways, buses, train stations, airports and 
such like.  It may be particularly useful for helping to secure large travel networks which may under terrorist 
threat, like the London Underground. 
- locating individuals under some kind of time pressure, for example those who are late for a flight, or in more 
severe circumstances trying to pin-point terrorists inside a building where hostages are being held. 
- in retail stores for tracking customer movements 
- in buildings for tracking who in inside or outside 
- for specific surveillance e.g. on travel networks, sports stadiums, entertainment parks, universities, schools, 
workplaces, supermarkets, conferences and events with controlled access, for example via turnstiles.   This 
helps reduces risks of crime and terrorist attacks in venues and environments with a high density of people. 
 
Functionality: 
 
In order to join a Wi-Fi network, the system requires a picture of the user’s face.  The first time a user joins a 
network, this is stored with the MAC address of the device attempting to access the Wi-Fi in a central cloud-
based datastore.  Consider a MAC address to be a unique ID for each phone.  Once a facial image and MAC 
address are recorded for a given device, the next time access is attempted, the image of the user must 
match the original capture.  When a user returns to an environment where they have previously used the Wi-
Fi and requests access once more, the system will check their face against the stored picture, and if the 
MAC address matches the stored MAC address, then Wi-Fi access will be granted.   
 
In most cases it is thought the camera in the device attempting access will be used to take the picture.  
Alternatively, it can be taken via the installed cameras in the environment.  For example, a camera in a 
user’s house, or via a special kiosk camera in public, or cameras installed in the back of seats on a train.  
These cameras can be installed wherever the customer requests.   
 
A user can leave a network and re-join it easily.  An installed camera can automatically check the user’s face 
and mobile phone MAC address when Wi-Fi access is requested, and if there is a match with the data 
already stored then access is granted.   
 
In a home situation for example this prevents children using parent’s devices.  In other environments, if 
required, it is possible to alert an authority if a previously registered device attempts access and the image of 
the individual does not match that which is stored.  This authority could be an on-site administrator, or a 
security team.  In environments where the datastore is shared with official security services, they can be 
notified also, for example if a known criminal or terror suspect is identified.  
 
The system can track users in an environment via their phone’s MAC address.  People can also be tracked 
via their facial image.  For example, in an airport if a connected device is stationary for an abnormal period of 
time, security can be notified and it can be investigated.  The MAC address allows the specific model of 
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device to be identified.  For example, Samsung Galaxy Note 7 devices, which at time of writing are 
vulnerable to catching fire, have been banned by the US Department of Transportation from being carried 
onto a plane either in hand luggage or checked-in luggage. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Do you feel this system differs in any way from traditional CCTV systems?  If you do, please explain why. 
Yes as the CCTV system will not be able to identify you automatically against the MAC address. This system 
would be able to detect you personally. 
2. How concerned would you be about the possible collection of other data apart from your facial image and 
phone’s MAC address as an unavoidable by-product of using the system?  Presume this other data would 
simply be stored and not used for any other purpose. 
I would be concerned on what information is stored and if it is personally sensitive. I would like if this 
information would be disclosed. I would not be concerned as much if it is know that this information is not 
being used. 
3. Do you think collecting facial images and MAC addresses is sensitive data, compared to, say, your home 
address or your bank details?  Explain your answer.  
I believe that any collection of information that together can be used to identify a person is sensitive 
information. Even though other information described above could be even more sensitive. 
4. How important to you would it be to be able to access, edit or delete the information we store regarding 
you and your device? 
Very important. Being able to delete the information is a right that all data subjects should have as 
circumstances and viewpoints change. 
5. With this system it is possible your facial image may be recorded in the background when the system is 
analysing a person in the foreground.  How would you feel about that? 
I feel that there should be some method of blurring on background people to allow for some privacy of 
people captured. For example if a face is recognised the system could blur any other faces it recognises 
before it is saved. 
6. What, if any, information would you be worried about the system recording?  Please describe what that 
information would be and why it would concern you. 
I would be worried about the system storing location information as I would be uncomfortable if the system 
was able to track or predict where I was going at any given point. 
7. Tracking individuals and devices helps us identify people of interest, and devices that may be a threat.  In 
certain circumstances we may need to share our data with the security services to apprehend criminals.  
Would this tracking activity concern you, and if so why? 
I would be concerned in the case of how accurately the system can recognise a face. For example if I look 
like a known criminal but am not that person will it flag up a response from security personal? Also as stated 
above I would be concerned of any tracking facilities this software had 
8. Some mobile phone devices may pose a problem, like those which can catch fire.  Recently the Samsung 
Galaxy Note 7 was banned from all US flights as it was deemed to pose a danger by catching fire.  Would 
you want to know if someone had brought a banned model onto a plane?  How would you feel about your 
device model information being stored? 
I believe that this information would be relevant in stopping potential threats. I don’t think phone information 
should be stored but rather have the capability of checking the model against a list of vulnerable devices. If it 
does match a vulnerable model then a flag could be placed on the MAC address or information stored. 
9. How do you think you would react if the system mistook you for someone else by accident and you could 
not access Wi-Fi, or if you were mistaken for a person who the authorities wanted to speak to? 
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I would question the effectiveness of the system as a whole. I know that people can look similar but certain 
methods may be put in place. For example, if you are blocked from the Wi-Fi this could be disclosed and 
allow you to verify that you are a different person. I understand if it is an investigation this information must 
be kept secret and I would be deeply upset if the security forces accidently mistook me for a criminal. 
10. Storing facial images and phone MAC address speeds up accessing Wi-Fi where this system is installed, 
as then a user doesn’t need to provide a facial image each time.  How long would you be happy for us to 
keep this data for before it is deleted? 
I believe that maybe a period of 6 months would be appropriate to ask a user if they wish to update the 
information, keep the information the same or delete the data the system has stored on them. 
12. Sharing the information we store could prevent terrorist attacks.  Would you feel safer knowing that your 
travel route is being monitored for criminals and suspects? 
I don’t agree to the information being shared, but I think this could be alleviated by allowing faces of known 
criminals to be put onto the system to allow for identification without sharing all the information to security 
forces. 
13. How do you feel about your data being stored online in the cloud compared to on physical servers? 
I would be happier for cloud based servers as I think their security would be greater than that of a local 
server. 
14. How anonymous would you feel using the system as described?  Can you suggest anything that would 
make you feel more anonymous? 
I wouldn’t feel too anonymous as if the information was leaked or an insider threat was using the information 
for their own benefit they would be able to identify a vast amount of people. I believe that if the developers 
disclosed their policies in training staff, updating and correctness of data stored and how they ensure the 
data is secured it would help people feel this information they share will allow them to remain anonymous in 
practice. 
15. To make system more secure we were considering asking for a user’s date of birth and name as well on 
first registration so we can personalise the service.  Would you be happy to provide these details to make the 
system more secure?  Please discuss any concerns you might have also. 1,2,3,4 
I feel that storing this information is not what the product was designed to do. I believe this is not needed to 
provide the services described above, i.e. allow for Wi-Fi access. Even though having the mac address and 
photograph of the user is personal information if the system is compromised it may still be difficult for the 
hacker to determine the names and address of these people. While if this information is provide it could 
leave them at a greater risk. 
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Appendix A2 – Responses given to others 
Product Overview 
This app will use encryption to allow users to send text bases messages anonymously and privately. The 
message will be encrypted on the sender’s device using public key private key encryption methods. It is 
then sent to our server where it is stored and sent on to the recipient. It is then decrypted only when the 
message is opened. The user has the option of protecting the app using one of the following methods:   
 PIN  
 Password  
 On screen pattern  
 Facial recognition  
 Fingerprint (if the hardware allows)  
Facial recognition and fingerprint data will only be stored on the users device and will be encrypted. There 
will also be optional two-factor authentication that can be used in conjunction with one or more of the 
above methods. It comes in the form of a token generating a 6-didget code on the push of a button.  
The app will have two modes, a ‘private’ mode and a ‘private and anonymous’ mode. In the former, the 
users account will be tied to their phone number, this means that other people will only need their phone 
number to be able to send them a message. In ‘private and anonymous’ mode, each user will have a unique 
identification number that can be used to send them a message. 
Stakeholder Profile 
You are the company’s Data Protection Officer (DPO). You are quite technically literate and personally very 
concerned with the privacy of the users of the app. 
Questions 
1. Do you see any breaches or potential breaches in the Data Protection Act or any other legislation in 
the app described above?   
 
There are a number of points I would make here.  Strictly speaking we aren't collecting the facial 
recognition data and the fingerprint data if they are only being stored on the user device.  However, 
if we are assigning users a unique identification number we should be careful.  If these are assigned 
by us to users then we are holding personal data, as that ID can be used to identify a user.  Give 
some thought to when we are assigning those IDs - are we are only assigning those unique IDs to 
users when they first use the 'private and anonymous mode' (i.e. they may never have unique ID if 
they never use that mode), or are we assigning those unique IDs to everyone who uses the app, 
regardless if they use that mode or not.  Either way it needs to be made very clear to the user that 
we are assigning or may assign them a unique ID which we can identify them by. 
 
We need to define how long the encrypted messages are kept on our servers and what happens if 
the message is not delivered for some reason.  It is mentioned that it is stored but there needs to be 
more detail on that from user’s point of view.   
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Principle 7 of the Data Protection Act (DPA) concerns information security, stating: 
“Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against unauthorised or 
unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, 
personal data.” 
 
If per chance the data is decrypted, and that data is sensitive, such as their religious beliefs or info 
regarding their physical or mental health, we may be open to action being taken against us, even if 
we are following encryption guidelines from the likes of the ICO.  I am not aware of a concrete legal 
definition of “appropriate” as above and there is always the chance a jury would say the encryption 
and other technical measures we might take are not “appropriate”. 
 
We also need to be careful that this app is not used for assisted in committed any offences under 
the Computer Misuse Act.  The Computer Misuse Offences are: 
 
1. Unauthorised access to computer material. 
2. Unauthorised access with intent to commit or facilitate 
commission of further offences. 
3. Unauthorised acts with intent to impair, or with 
recklessness as to impairing, operation of computer, etc. 
3A. Making, supplying or obtaining articles for use in offence 
under section 1 or 3. 
 
If we study part 3A closely: 
3A. Making, supplying or obtaining articles for use in offence under section 1 or 3 - 
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if he makes, adapts, supplies or offers to supply any article 
intending it to be used to commit, or to assist in the commission of, an offence under section 1 or 3. 
(2) A person is guilty of an offence if he supplies or offers to supply any article believing that it is 
likely to be used to commit, or to assist in the commission of, an offence under section 1 or 3. 
(3) A person is guilty of an offence if he obtains any article with a view to its being supplied for use 
to commit, or to assist in the commission of, an offence under section 1 or 3. 
(4) In this section “article” includes any program or data held in electronic form. 
 
Can I draw your attention to part (2) in italics above.  We need to decide if we believe the app is 
likely to be used to assist the commission of an offence under the Computer Misuse Act.  There are 
two questions in this stakeholder document relating to criminal behavior so perhaps you and your 
team have begun to think about this already and I would urge to you to continue to consider it 
seriously. 
 
There is a General Data Protection Regulation that was agreed in April 2016, this will come into 
force in two years on May 2018 across Europe – despite Brexit we need to be ready for that too 
even though it is not an immediate concern, and I would recommend your team are familiar with 
that also.  Our legal partners, Allen & Overy, sent me this guide:  
http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Radical%20changes%20to%20European%20
data%20protection%20legislation.pdf.  For example, as per that regulation, where personal data is 
processed for direct marketing the data subject will have a right to object.  This right will have to be 
explicitly brought to a user’s attention. 
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Lastly we will need to seek further legal advice for the other parts of the world that this app might 
be rolled out in.  I am not aware of all the legislation in each territory and the legislation which we 
adhere to in the UK could conflict with that of other countries but what I can say is there are 
embargos in place for certain countries and in theory we could be breaking those if we are selling 
the app in restricted areas.   
 
2. If the user’s anonymity was compromised, how do you think public reaction to this would impact 
the company?  
 
I think there could be a scandal, given that is one of the inherent key features provided by using the 
app.  This would hold true for a normal member of the public and in additoin if a person in the 
security services, public eye or political arena was revealed to be using the app then there might be 
pressure as to why, and lead to questions or pressure on us regarding what was in the content of 
the messages.  Any public scandal would affect our reputation, which we can’t measure the cost of, 
our customer’s trust and we could suffer financial penalties too if we are found to be breaking the 
law. 
 
3. If the user’s private messages where compromised, how do you think public reaction to this would 
impact the company?   
 
If the content was scandalous then we would be under pressure for having facilitated the sending of 
these messages.  Even if the content was not scandalous then we would be under pressure as if one 
set of messages were compromised, the question would be asked how soon could others be 
compromised.   In the former case, we would be scrutinised regarding whether or not we knew what 
the content of the messages were, and pleading ignorance will not cut it, if for example terrorists 
were exchanging messages and we in theory could have decrypted those messages if we wanted to.  
The argument would then be our lack of action in this area could indirectly be helping criminals.   At 
the same time the value proposition is that the messages are only decrypted once the receiving user 
opens then, so our teams do not know what the messages are at any point.  A key question here is 
whether our teams do not or should not know what the messages are.  Can we get the content of 
the messages if we want to?  We could be accused of assisting offenders and ethically that is hard 
to defend and would damage our reputation, even if our terms & conditions and DPA provisions 
were watertight.  
 
4. If a user’s facial recognition or fingerprint data was successfully extracted from a lost or stolen 
device, how do you think public reaction to this would impact the company?  
 
Again the reaction would not be favourable though I would assert a number of other companies 
with apps on the phone could be compromised at the same time, so the focus may not solely be on 
our app.  Still, we should always consider the worst case scenario.  Whilst we would not be 
collecting this data ourselves per se, if it goes no further than the user phone, it would indicate a 
vulnerability in the application which, rightly or wrongly, may be considered by our customers to 
stretch to other applications we develop too.  The public perception is important here even if legally 
there are no issues. 
 
5. Is there any personal information that you think customers would be uncomfortable with us 
keeping?    
 
There will be concerns I am sure about the possibility of personal information being contained 
within the encrypted messages that are stored on our servers.  Being transparent and gaining 
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consent is important, we have to give customers the choice.  If they aren’t totally comfortable with 
this then they have the choice obviously not to use the app in the first place.  Location data is 
increasingly sensitive so if we are capturing that to analyse where the app is being used then we 
need to take care and again explain explicitly that this is happening.  If the app is a paid for “as-a-
service” then I think keeping customer details and bank details is reasonable as long as it is secured, 
in fact it is likely going to be required for the project to be financially feasible. 
 
6. Anonymous metadata regarding how many people are using the app and what parts of the world 
the app is popular in may be kept for our own marketing purposes. Do you foresee any problems or 
scandals arising because of this?  
It depends how exactly we are gathering the data and if the end results are anonymized, or if the 
users are truly anonymous during the metadata gathering.  If we are simply counting the number of 
users without identifying them during that count then I do not see any problem in that specific case.  
If individually identifying each user is an unavoidable part during the process of checking which 
parts of the world the app is popular in, even if we are only using the aggregate anonymous data 
for marketing, then we need make users aware this is happening and give them the option to opt-in, 
not opt-out.   We shouldn’t be gathering location information by default – customers should be 
choosing to opt-in to that, I can’t stress this enough.  The temptation may be there in the marketing 
department to use the individual’s location data eventually for targeted marketing specific to that 
individual.  The public bristle at the thought of any idea of tracking and targeting that may be 
happening to them, or could happen to them in future without their knowledge.   We need to make 
the user aware that this data may be kept for our own marketing purposes, it has to be specifically 
stated to them that this may happen, and they have to agree to it. 
This anonymous metadata can be considered a residual risk of encrypted data transfer, for example 
if it stored in an unencrypted form which is then the target of an attack. If our implementation relies 
on public-key infrastructure, then I assert it must implement strict certificate checking to maintain 
trust in end-points.  This is a useful guide from the ICO:  https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-
to-data-protection/encryption/data-transfer/ 
 
As outlined above it sounds like there could be some form of tracking taking place if we are able to 
determine where someone is using the app.  There have been numerous cases, e.g. with the 
Snowden leaks, showing that this metadata can be used to build up a picture of which unique user 
IDs are talking to each other, how many messages they are sending, when they are sending the 
messages and where in the world they are.  We need to consider this carefully.  If we get a Freedom 
of Information request asking for location data we could be in trouble if we haven’t been 
transparent with users that this is happening.  The same applies for a Subject Access Request asking 
about what data we hold and why hold it – if that shows the geographical data gained via some 
sort of tracking, and users are not aware of this, then that could trigger a scandal. 
 
7. Do you have any concerns over the apps potential to be used for criminal activity and what 
implementations that might have for the reputation of the company?  
Yes, for sure.  Criminals want their communication to be secret and it could be said an encrypted 
messaging app would be attractive to them.  For this reason, we need to tread carefully, we do not 
want to be seen to be supporting criminals if they use our app and then publicise that use, or 
somehow recommend our app to others.  We have to be whiter-than-white and for good reason to 
protect our user’s privacy.  If authorities request access to the encrypted messages or user details 
then we would be in a very difficult position, akin to that which Apple faced when the FBI wanted 
information on a phone found after the San Bernardino shooting.  Do we relinquish the privacy 
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aspect the app is founded on, or not?  As a DPO I would say yes but naturally I cannot speak for the 
whole company and it depends on the context. 
8. Do you think we have any obligation to monitor potential criminal use?   
We aren’t legally obliged I don’t think but if anything suspicious seems to be taking place then we 
have to report it to the relevant authorities.  And as I’ve explained above, if we are deemed to be 
helping an attacker commit an offence under the Computer Misuse Act, I would be worried about 
hindsight showing us the whole thing could’ve been avoided if we were monitoring the app properly 
for criminal use.  We could consider including a statement regarding monitoring in the terms of use 
for the app though I understand this is at odds with the total privacy the angle is trying to achieve.   
Also, again bear in mind we might be asked to provide the decryption key by a UK court if there is a 
criminal investigation, for example if a phone is acquired by the police.   
9. Is there anything else, not outlined above, that you foresee being a potential problem or scandal? 
 
I think this app is a solid technical idea though pushes the ethical and legal boundaries compared to 
our standard messaging products.  I would urge caution again.  Some final points: 
 
- in the documentation for the app if it goes live eventually please make sure I am identified as the 
Data Protection Officer so I can handle relevant queries and issues for you.   
 
- consider where the messages are stored i.e. on a physical server only we can access that is under 
lock and key, versus secure storage in the cloud. 
 
- bear in mind the potential use of the app by those under 18. 
 
- presuming we are charging for this service, we need to consider the collection of bank details, 
billing addresses etc.  And it follows we will have their name also.  All the data then becomes 
personal data as we can link it to an individual.  Even if we don’t have their name the other data is 
still enough to identify the individual if we have this unique ID, which is obviously for ID purposes.  
We are going to have a listing, somewhere, of unique IDs matched against phone numbers.  If this is 
the case, we need to handle all of this as personal data as this processing falls within the scope of 
the DPA.   We have to be careful about the type of encryption used and the details of that as if that 
information is compromised then those messages could be decrypted with enough computing 
power. 
 
- consider if we also store the PIN, password and on-screen pattern on our side, this isn’t mentioned 
in the product overview. 
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Privacy Impact Assessment Consultation Questionnaire  
Company Background 
We are a medium sized logistics company with between 200-300 staff. Every employee in the organisation, 
including C level executives, department heads and low level staff, have been provided with a corporate 
email account. The organisation has an IT department of 8 members who are responsible for the operation, 
administration and maintenance of infrastructure including mail servers. The R&D department are 
responsible for the developing of a new system with the purpose of reducing the number of phishing emails 
arriving in employee mailboxes.  
Your role 
You are an external shareholder of the company on the board of directors. Your opinion is vital for this 
privacy impact assessment as you may be required to react in the event of a scandal. As an important 
stakeholder in the company your opinions will weigh heavily on the decisions taken in development. 
System overview 
The new email security system will analyse all incoming and outgoing emails in order to detect potential 
phishing scams. This will be achieved by analysis of the metadata, headers, and body of each email against 
signatures of known suspicious communications. The system will also incorporate sophisticated analysis of 
attachments to reduce the number of malicious files received by employees. Suspicious communications 
will be quarantined and stored until reviewed by a system administrator (member of IT). Due to the nature 
of the system it is unlikely to be 100 percent accurate and false positive may occur. As the system is in the 
early stages of development it has not been decided whether the solution will be hosted locally or cloud 
based. 
 
Q1. Do you think that it is acceptable to implement a system which scans every incoming and outgoing 
corporate email for the purposes of reducing the likelihood of a breach caused by a phishing attack? 
Yes, absolutely.  These attacks are so common, and many do not make the news.  Our company is of the 
typical size which are targeted by hackers as they feel we will not have security measures like you describe.  
We do need to take care though that the team monitoring the communications has the correct training and 
we have to make sure all the staff are aware that the monitoring is taking place, and why we are doing it.  
As an external shareholder I don’t want my return on investment harmed either by a scandal being 
triggered. 
Q2. The new email system will likely store suspicious employee emails for a period of time until reviewed 
by a system admin, which may lead to the disclosure of employee personal information to these members 
of staff. Please indicate your concerns regarding this. 
1. How long are these emails stored for exactly, where are they stored and how secure are they. 
2.  After they have been reviewed, they should be deleted once no longer needed – will this be the case? 
3. I would be concerned about a member of the IT staff reading emails with the sensitive personal 
information of others.  This is difficult to manage as I appreciate we need to do this, and this is the first time 
we are introducing it.  That said, might I suggest staff should only use corporate email for corporate use, 
that way the chances of that happening are greatly reduced. 
4. I’m not comfortable with how that responsibility for reading sensitive emails is delegated, it seems too 
simple for me. 
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Q3. Have you any opinions on strategies which could be implemented to minimise the exposure of emails 
containing personal information? 
I think it is very important as few people have access to them as possible, and that they are securely stored 
so that they cannot be compromised and leaked to others. 
Q4. Do you think that additional training of administrators of the new system in the handling of personal 
information would be beneficial in avoiding potential scandal? 
Yes, this is essential I think, though the effectiveness of the training depends on selecting the right people to 
train in the first place.  If we have unreliable people reviewing these emails then they could steal personal 
information, or leak commercially sensitive business information to the press.  I gather the Data Protection 
Act requires us to take steps to ensure reliability of any staff who have access to personal data.  I don’t want 
my emails being reviewed by a bunch of amateurs.  
Q5. Do you think that a change in company policy regarding the transmission of personal data by 
employees would be beneficial in avoiding potential scandal? Please explain. 
Yes, we need to make them aware we are doing this, and changing company policy to state, for example, 
that personal data should not be transmitted by corporate email, is a good idea.  The wording used in the 
company policy and the reasons for it need explained clearly to all staff, or else the change in company 
policy in itself could lead to a scandal if it arouses suspicion, even if we have everyone’s best interests at 
heart. 
Q6. In your opinion what would be the most effective way of notifying staff regarding the new system to 
minimise possible outrage at privacy violation. 
We need to highlight the fact we as a company face a threat by hackers from phishing attacks, and the 
damage this can cause, such as if we are blackmailed.  Then we can explain as a preventative measure we 
are considering developing this new system, and consult with the staff to take their concerns into 
consideration as well.  We should do this in person with everyone and then make a record that they have 
been informed for completeness, but also hold review sessions, say every 6 months.  We should explain 
what the system does and does not do.  If we hide anything from the staff this could trigger a scandal if we 
haven’t been honest with them. 
Q7. Developers of the system are assessing the merits of a cloud based solution which would mean that the 
processing of employee emails would be carried out externally. Please indicate your concerns regarding 
privacy in this matter. 
I would be concerned regarding how we control the data they are looking at, how long they are keeping it 
for and their deletion policies.  We would have to trust an external third party not to mishandle this 
information – for example passing company information to the press - and also trust that their security 
systems and storage systems are strong enough to withstand attacks.  If all our email communication is to 
be directed to this external company then we expose ourselves to significantly higher risk than if we keep 
everything in-house in my opinion. 
Q8. In your opinion what are the privacy implications of inspecting every attachment which travels through 
our mail server?    
I can understand the need for attachment inspection to check if they contain viruses and so on that could 
damage the company.  At the same time inspecting every single attachment sounds excessive, surely out of 
10,000 attachments maybe only one or two are suspect?  For example, could it be argued if an email is 
exchanged between two people within the organisation, and the content seems perfectly reasonable, then 
there is no need to check any attachments?  Then again there is the argument that the attachments need to 
be inspected in any event – the phishing attacks are getting so complex these days, especially with social 
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engineering where attackers could be impersonating our employees and encouraging them to open 
attachments that may seem innocent, like invoices or word documents, when in fact they are malicious. 
Q9. Can you think of any other scenario leading to scandal which may arise because of the proposed new 
system?   
You correctly mention false positives.  I think mistakenly identifying someone as some sort of suspect or 
highlighting someone (or some email) for blame could cause problems for us, for example if a member of 
staff felt discriminated against or ostracised for opening a malicious attachment.   I wouldn’t that 
happening to me, as an external shareholder I have invested in this business for the long-term. 
Q10. Can you think of any additional measures which could be taken to avoid scandal due to a breach of 
privacy caused by the new system? 
The legislation needs checked thoroughly, particularly the Data Protection Act, to ensure we are compliant if 
this new system is implemented. 
Thank you for your feedback. 
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Privacy Impact Assessment Questionnaire – Customer 
 
Product Overview: 
This product is used in conjunction with online sales websites, i.e. amazon, eBay, and it will monitor 
purchases made by customers in order to suggest additional products that may benefit from being used 
with the purchase. Details held in the system include: Card details, name, and delivery address. The product 
will also monitor transaction details to try detect fraudulent activity on the account and help mitigate from 
this.  
 
Stake Holder Profile: 
You are a 30-40 year old Father of two teenage kids. You are of average technology awareness but have 
been targeted by fraudsters in the past that cost you >£1000 of damages from credit card fraud so is 
sceptical of releasing card details. All members of the family commonly use web services to purchase items. 
 
Questions: 
Do you think this service is different from other what current occurs on sites like eBay? If yes, explain how?   
From what is explained above, I don’t think so on first impression.  When I have used eBay to buy products 
for myself and my children I regularly am recommended other products to be used with the purchase.  eBay 
stores the same details as described above too.  What I am not sure about is what the relationship between 
the selling site and the product, mainly who does the actual recommending (the site or your company 
making the product), and who stores my personal data (again the site, or the company making the product).  
I have been targeted in the past so I am wary of this. 
What type of information would you be willing to release to the system? I.e. Name, address etc.  
I understand for ordering items, giving my name and address are reasonable expectations.  My credit card 
details are needed to make purchases, I understand that – but I am not sure I would be comfortable 
releasing credit card details to a 3rd party company working in conjunction with a selling site. 
Is there any information you would be uncomfortable to release to the system?   
As above – I would be wary of giving my credit card details to a 3rd party that wasn’t the site itself as I have 
been targeted by fraudsters in the past.  I would not really be keen for the location of my purchase to be 
recorded by the system, nor those of my family. 
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Are there any reasons why you may wish to hide your purchases from someone? I.e. your family, friends 
etc.  
Not that I can think of, though if I was buying gifts for my kids for Christmas I would not want them 
stumbling across those details.  I don’t see why my purchases should not be hidden as a default to be 
honest. 
Are there any products that you think may be too sensitive for the system to take record off?   
I would not be happy with the product recording products that might reveal information about my or my 
family’s physical or mental health, for example if they were buying medical products or resources. 
Do you have any concerns about how the data may be handled within the system?   
Yes, since I have been targeted in the past I would want significant reassurances about how well my 
personal data is secured, where is stored, who has access to it and how long it is kept for.  Sometimes 3rd 
parties sell data onto other companies too and I do not want to be hassled in this manner. 
Would you object to members of the Fraud detection team being able to extract your transaction 
information from the system? 
I would want to know that your fraud detection team had been trained properly and that they were reliable 
people, not a bunch of part-timers.  I would object in the first instance unless you could prove this to me 
somehow when I signed up to use the service. 
Would you have any reason for you to ask the developers to release your information from the system?   
Yes I am a firm believer that I should be able to access any data you hold on me.  So the very fact I am 
asking should be reason enough and I would like to know the process for this before I used the product.  If by 
‘release’ you mean delete then yes if I was no longer using the product I would want all my data deleted, 
and in any event I would not want my data held for any longer than was necessary.  I don’t see why this 
data would still be held if I wasn’t using the system or had used it for a period of time. 
How likely is it that another person my use your details to purchase an item online? I.e. a family member or 
friend.   
It is very likely, I let my wife use my account to keep things simple.  I wouldn’t let a friend use it though.   She 
is my wife obviously so it is different for her using my account compared to a friend but I am not sure I 
would want her to be able to see all the products I had bought in the past, in case some were presents for 
her, or for some other reason.  My privacy is my privacy at the end of the day and no-one else’s. 
How many locations would you have as a delivery address for transactions?  
I can think of two, my house and my office at work.  Though I am thinking about only having things 
delivered to my house in future as I’ve heard about systems being compromised and the delivery address 
being changed to other people in other countries. 
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PRIVACY IMPACT ASSEM ENT 
QUESTIONNAIRE  
Stakeholder Profile 
Data protection officer: you are the data protection officer for a company intending to use this system. You 
will be in charge of managing this software and performing initial reviews on any flagged items. You will also 
be responsible for its implementation and for the storage of personal data which is collected. You have been 
asked in the past to help in internal investigation will be asked to use this software in the future to investigate 
employees for not following code of conduct or other minor productivity issues. 
Product Overview 
Functionality 
This is a workplace monitoring software for use in organisation to improve productivity and to perform 
investigations into staff for insider threats and offences under the code of conduct. The software has a 
number of features including email monitoring, internet monitoring, file tracking and internal communication 
monitoring. The software also offers configurability based on employee access level and other characteristics. 
The software will monitor emails, recording the subject, date and time of employee’s emails. The software 
can be set up to flag keywords in the content of emails which will alert the system admin and require review 
of email content to decide whether or not this is a valid concern. The keywords which are searched for are 
set by the system admin to fit the company’s needs and extra search words can be added to particular 
employees which are suspected of breaking contract or code of conduct. The software will also monitor all 
outgoing email attachments for detection information leaks. Similar monitoring features will be implemented 
to monitor internal communication. 
The software will log all internet traffic, storing the time and date, user location, and sites visited. The 
software will not store search terms or keystrokes and will not log what pages are visited on a site. The system 
admin can set a list of restricted sites which if visited will flag that the user has visited the site.  
The software also logs employee file access and can flag when a user accesses a file which would not be 
needed for their role. The software will also monitor any coping of files to removable media or to online 
services. 
Implementation and policies 
The software can be set up to know employee access rights to prevent false positives and also logging 
features can be reduced at certain times of the day or if a device is not on the organisations network (i.e. 
personal device at home). The data collected by the system is available to all the senior IT personnel and all 
managers can access data on the staff they supervise. The data will be retained until the admin of the 
software feels it is no longer relevant. 
There will be full disclosure to staff about data retention policies, management policies and monitoring 
activity at the start of employment with reminder sent yearly. Staff will be notified of any widespread changes 
to the policies except for cases of individual investigation where monitoring can be increased without 
notification. Keywords used will not be disclosed so as to maintain effectiveness. 
Questions 
Please answer questions bellow in text boxes. Feel free to increase their size if necessary. Thank you in 
advance for your participation. 
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Question 1: Have you any concerns about sensitive person data (i.e. data that can be used to discriminate) 
being collected by this system? 
 
Question 2: Do you think this is an acceptable level of monitoring for web browsing? 
 
Question 3: Have you any concerns with automatic scanning of emails for key words and flagging findings 
to admin staff? 
 
Question 4: Do you agree with the frequency of notification to staff about the monitoring? 
 
Question 5: Have you any concerns with monitoring internal communications for key words? 
 
  
The DPA principles state personal data shall be not be excessive and it sounds like what we are 
monitoring might be over the top.  We need to make sure if we go ahead with this we are only 
holding as little information as possible to achieve what we want to – can’t we just block the 
sites we don’t want people to access instead of tracking them like this?  I do not think the 
assigning of keywords to flag a review of email content should be set by a system admin, 
especially if that privilege is abused.  I’d suggest some sort of working group to do this requiring 
a layer or two of sign-off from management.  The system admin deciding when the data will be 
deleted is also cause for concern, for example if they forget to delete it and the data store is 
compromised, or again if a system admin keeps emails and personal data for malicious use.  It 
sounds like logging features may have to be manually reduced for devices leaving the network 
and I am definitely not comfortable with that.  If this is the case we run the risk of intentionally 
or unintentionally logging activity to the same degree outside the office as inside the office and 
this could trigger a major scandal.   
 
I am still coming to terms with this – if we have to protect from insider threats then we have to 
be able to make sure employees aren’t triggering some sort of attacks via visiting malicious 
websites that might infect our network.  That is the reality.  That said, for those not up to speed 
on the reasons for this web browsing, it might not be acceptable.  We need to make sure we are 
transparent and very clear for our reasons for doing this. 
Yes, again I am not comfortable with the admin staff having responsibility for setting the filters.  
We would like to think this would not be abused but it is this type of filter misuse that can 
trigger a scandal.  Who monitors the monitors, if you follow me?  i.e. who is checking the admin 
staff?  We need to be on top of this if it is implemented, they can’t be left to their own devices. 
No in fact I think it should be at least quarterly.  Perhaps the development team could build-in 
an on-screen notice every time a user logs in, that way they we would be issuing a reminder 
daily.  It could be too much though, people may be immune to it eventually, so maybe once a 
week or once a fortnight is better.  We could set up a consultation group with the staff about 
this. 
Yes, it could be open to abuse and inappropriate key words could be used.  Again this comes 
back to exactly what type of filtering is being done.  We can’t afford for commercially sensitive 
information to be gathered and potentially be made available to outside parties, and of course 
our staff might consider this to be very intrusive.  Corporate email is not meant to be for 
personal use but we need to be realistic that is not adhered to 100% of the time. 
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Question 6: Have you any concerns over the availability of the data collected by the monitoring software and 
who can access it? 
 
Question 7: Have you any concerns over potential abuse of the automated systems? 
 
Question 8: Is the data retention policy acceptable to prevent holding irrelevant information? 
 
Question 9: Can you identify any issues which could cause scandal for the company if publically released? 
 
Question 10: Have you any other privacy concerns or legal concerns in regards to data protection? 
 
 
I am not comfortable with all managers having access to data on the staff they supervise.  In 
theory they could access the sensitive personal data being collected and discriminate or 
ostracize staff, or at least the staff could make those sorts of claims.  It is important for people 
handling that sort of data to be trained in doing so, and also be reliable in the first instance.  I 
can’t say right now if all our senior IT personnel and all managers are suitable or not, we need to 
find this out.  The data should be available to as few people as possible and I think this is too 
wide a group of people.   
 
 
Yes we are open to that happening sadly.  I would like to think it wouldn’t happen but it is a 
possibility, so the correct checks and controls have to be in place.  I don’t feel giving all the 
responsibility to our system admin is the right way to do it, it needs to be some sort of group 
consensus, and there needs to be a check on the how the automated systems are being used.  In 
fact might I suggest I am directly involved in that group to offer guidance and protect us from 
scandal. 
 
 
I would assert not – we need to be more specific about how long we are holding information for, 
and when it is being deleted.  Transparency here will appease the concerns of the staff. 
 
 
I think I’ve outlined several above – my feeling is that the monitoring may be excessive and I 
think the number of people with access to the data is too large, this logically increases the 
chances of a scandal if there a more potential points for information to be leaked.  If a system 
admin was abusing the system to gather personal data and the public was made aware of this, it 
would trigger a scandal for sure.  If we wrongly suspect someone of wrong doing, that is also bad 
for the company’s reputation.  Monitoring workplace productivity using this tool sounds too 
authoritarian I have to say – surely there are other ways to boost productivity than this?  We 
don’t want a reputation for micro-managing people. 
 
 
We need to give more thought to how this fits in with the Data Protection Act.  We could take a 
softer approach and insist on consent from an individual but then we couldn’t compel them to 
do that, and if they don’t consent where does that leave them in terms of their specific role?  
Alternatively, there is a condition of data processing that states the processing has to be in 
accordance with a “legitimate interest” condition.  I think we could say protecting ourselves 
from insider threats and so on is a legitimate interest though we should double-check this.  In 
that situation, we would not need the explicit consent of all staff but I would strongly 
recommend that just as much effort is put in with regard to making them aware of what is being 
proposed or it could backfire and trigger a scandal. 
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Appendix B – Data Protection Act 1998 – the eight Principles plus Schedule 2 and 3 
SCHEDULE 1 
 
The data protection principles 
 
Part I 
 
The principles 
 
1. Personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully and, in particular, shall not be processed unless— 
(a) at least one of the conditions in Schedule 2 is met, and 
(b) in the case of sensitive personal data, at least one of the conditions in Schedule 3 is also met. 
 
2. Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful purposes, and shall not be 
further processed in any manner incompatible with that purpose or those purposes. 
 
3. Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose or purposes for 
which they are processed. 
 
4. Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date. 
 
5. Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept for longer than is necessary for 
that purpose or those purposes. 
 
6. Personal data shall be processed in accordance with the rights of data subjects under this Act. 
 
7. Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against unauthorised or unlawful 
processing of personal data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data. 
 
8. Personal data shall not be transferred to a country or territory outside the European Economic Area unless 
that country or territory ensures an adequate level of protection for the rights and freedoms of data subjects 
in relation to the processing of personal data. 
 
SCHEDULE 2 
 
Conditions relevant for purposes of the first principle: processing of any personal data 
 
1. The data subject has given his consent to the processing. 
 
2. The processing is necessary— 
(a) for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is a party, or 
(b) for the taking of steps at the request of the data subject with a view to entering into a contract. 
 
3. The processing is necessary for compliance with any legal obligation to which the data controller is 
subject, other than an obligation imposed by contract. 
 
4. The processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject. 
 
5. The processing is necessary— 
(a) for the administration of justice, 
(b) for the exercise of any functions conferred on any person by or under any enactment, 
(c) for the exercise of any functions of the Crown, a Minister of the Crown or a government department, or 
(d) for the exercise of any other functions of a public nature exercised in the public interest by any person. 
 
6.—(1) The processing is necessary for the purposes of legitimate interests pursued by the data controller or 
by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where the processing is unwarranted in 
any particular case by reason of prejudice to the rights and freedoms or legitimate interests of the data 
subject. 
(2) The Secretary of State may by order specify particular circumstances in which this condition is, or is not, 
to be taken to be satisfied. 
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SCHEDULE 3 
 
Conditions relevant for purposes of the first principle: processing of sensitive personal data 
 
1. The data subject has given his explicit consent to the processing of the personal data. 
 
2.—(1) The processing is necessary for the purposes of exercising or performing any right or obligation 
which is conferred or imposed by law on the data controller in connection with employment. 
(2) The Secretary of State may by order— 
(a) exclude the application of sub-paragraph (1) in such cases as may be specified, or 
 (b) provide that, in such cases as may be specified, the condition in subparagraph 
(1) is not to be regarded as satisfied unless such further conditions as may be specified in the order are also 
satisfied. 
 
3. The processing is necessary— 
(a) in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or another person, in a case where— 
(i) consent cannot be given by or on behalf of the data subject, or 
(ii) the data controller cannot reasonably be expected to obtain 
the consent of the data subject, or 
(b) in order to protect the vital interests of another person, in a case where consent by or on behalf of the 
data subject has been unreasonably withheld. 
 
4. The processing— 
(a) is carried out in the course of its legitimate activities by any body or association which— 
(i) is not established or conducted for profit, and 
(ii) exists for political, philosophical, religious or trade-union purposes, 
(b) is carried out with appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of data subjects, 
(c) relates only to individuals who either are members of the body or association or have regular contact with 
it in connection with its purposes, and 
(d) does not involve disclosure of the personal data to a third party without the consent of the data subject. 
 
5. The information contained in the personal data has been made public as a result of steps deliberately 
taken by the data subject. 
 
6. The processing— 
(a) is necessary for the purpose of, or in connection with, any legal proceedings (including prospective legal 
proceedings), 
(b) is necessary for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, or 
(c) is otherwise necessary for the purposes of establishing, exercising or defending legal rights. 
 
7.—(1) The processing is necessary— 
(a) for the administration of justice, 
(b) for the exercise of any functions conferred on any person by or under an enactment, or 
(c) for the exercise of any functions of the Crown, a Minister of the Crown or a government department. 
(2) The Secretary of State may by order— 
(a) exclude the application of sub-paragraph (1) in such cases as may be specified, or 
(b) provide that, in such cases as may be specified, the condition in subparagraph 
(1) is not to be regarded as satisfied unless such further conditions as may be specified in the order are also 
satisfied. 
 
8.—(1) The processing is necessary for medical purposes and is undertaken by— 
 (a) a health professional, or 
(b) a person who in the circumstances owes a duty of confidentiality which is equivalent to that which would 
arise if that person were a health professional. 
(2) In this paragraph “medical purposes” includes the purposes of preventative medicine, medical diagnosis, 
medical research, the provision of care and treatment and the management of healthcare services. 
 
9.—(1) The processing— 
(a) is of sensitive personal data consisting of information as to racial or ethnic origin, 
(b) is necessary for the purpose of identifying or keeping under review the existence or absence of equality 
of opportunity or treatment between persons of different racial or ethnic origins, with a view to enabling such 
equality to be promoted or maintained, and 
(c) is carried out with appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of data subjects. 
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(2) The Secretary of State may by order specify circumstances in which processing falling within sub-
paragraph (1)(a) and (b) is, or is not, to be taken for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1)(c) to be carried out 
with appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of data subjects. 
10. The personal data are processed in circumstances specified in an order made by the Secretary of State 
for the purposes of this paragraph. 
